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This project examines two works of nineteenth-century utopian fiction, Edward 
Bellamy’s Looking Backward and William Morris’s News from Nowhere, and considers 
the way in which the organization of work in these imagined post-capitalist futures is 
guided by their respective philosophies of labor: while Bellamy’s utopia is structured by 
an understanding of labor as primarily a social duty, Morris presents labor as central to 
the full development and happiness of the individual. These two utopias are read as 
representative of a fundamental tension within the writings of Marx: while Morris’s 
understanding of labor aligns with the early works of Marx, Bellamy’s vision is an 
expression of later attempts by Marx to distinguish between productive activity 
performed in the “realm of necessity” and that performed in the “realm of freedom.” This 
project identifies in Bellamy’s utopia a continued presence of alienated labor and reads 
this limitation as the inevitable outcome of an attempt to realize Marx’s distinction 
between necessary and free production; Morris’s ability to eradicate alienated labor in 
his utopia is thus only possible because he abandons this distinction and recognizes, as 
did the early Marx, the centrality of all forms of production to the individual’s realization 
of her creative human essence. However, while Morris overcomes alienation, his attempt 
to break with the material foundations of capitalism leaves his utopia unsustainable; this 
project therefore looks to Bellamy’s economic structures in an attempt to imagine how 
Morris’s labor philosophy might be infused with Bellamy’s structural elements to create 
a socialist future which would grow from the material conditions of capitalism while 
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Chapter One: Fulfilling the “Edict of Eden” in Looking Backward...............................18 







Marx was skeptical of the political efficacy of utopian thinking. In The 
Communist Manifesto, he critiques utopian socialists like Henri Saint-Simon, Charles 
Fourier, and Robert Owen for their inability to understand the role of historical forces and 
class antagonism in bringing about social change. For Marx, their “fantastic pictures of 
future society,” while revolutionary in their thinking, lose “all practical value” once the 
proletariat begins to realize itself as a class and engage in concrete political action (255). 
However, Marx’s critique here cannot be understood as an indictment against envisioning 
a post-capitalist future; in fact, he argues that utopian texts have intrinsic value as critical 
works: because their radically alternative visions of society serve to “attack every 
principle of existing society,” they are “full of the most valuable materials for the 
enlightenment of the working class” (255). For Marx, utopian thinking becomes a 
detriment only when it is considered as the equivalent of or alternative to immediate 
political action; Marx lauds future visions for their ability to act as a critical lens that 
could motivate and supplement “practical” activity. While Marx himself never produced 
a systematic utopian vision, he constantly interwove glimpses of the post-capitalist future 
with his analysis of the current system. It is in these moments, in which Marx provides 
visions of a world beyond capitalism, that the ultimate aim of the political action he 
advocates becomes most clear. As I argue in this thesis, the anticipatory moments of 
Marx’s work all point towards “a society in which the full and free development of the 
individual forms the ruling principle” (Capital V. 1 739). However, an examination of 
these moments, while revealing continuity of purpose, also reveals a discontinuity in 
Marx’s work concerning the way in which this full and free development would be 




significant change in Marx’s philosophical understanding of the role of labor. While in 
his earlier works, Marx understands labor to be a necessary aspect of the individual’s full 
and free development, his later works distinguish socially necessary acts of labor from 
free individual activity, creating a condition in which labor becomes a foundation, as 
opposed to an active component, of this development.  
 Understanding this discontinuity is important for those interested in the 
continuing relevance of Marx’s political project: because this shift in Marx’s philosophy 
produces practical differences in the end goal of social change, any movement towards 
this type of change must choose a direction. One path allows for a continuance of the 
basic distinction between work and free time that structures society under the capitalist 
system, while the other would require a fundamental break with this distinction. In this 
project, I will examine two socialist utopias, Edward Bellamy’s Looking Backward and 
William Morris’s News from Nowhere, as respective representations of these two 
disparate paths with the intention of better understanding both the potential and the 
limitations of Marx’s theories through their application in these imagined futures: I will 
be employing these utopias as a critical lens, as Marx imagined, but I will be turning that 
lens not on the capitalist system, but on Marx himself. My project will not be solely 
critical in its function, however. In considering the way in which Marx’s own ideas 
concerning the post-capitalist future are expressed in the systematic form of the utopian 
novel, his brief glimpses can be examined as holistic visions that may act, not as political 
programs in themselves, but as “an indication of the kind of place it is worth desiring” 
(Dentith 149). As Frederic Jameson argues in his classic essay, “The Politics of Utopia,” 




conception of a systemic otherness, of an alternative society, which only the idea of 
utopia seems to keep alive” (36).  
 Before I begin to examine the novels themselves, I will outline my understanding 
of both the way in which Marx’s focus on the development of the individual remains 
consistent throughout his works, as well as the way in which his view of labor in relation 
to this development undergoes a fundamental change. The question of rupture versus 
continuity in Marx’s thought is one that has been discussed heatedly since the publication 
in the twentieth century of previously unpublished writings composed early in his career. 
These works proposed the presence of a human essence or inherent human nature that 
some Marxists found incompatible with the materialist doctrines of his later works. The 
argument for the presence of a decisive rupture in Marx’s thinking is still most notably 
embodied by Louis Althusser, whose proposal of the “epistemological break” in the 
1960s continues to structure debates within Marxist studies. For Althusser, Marx’s body 
of work can be divided into two distinct periods: the ideological and the scientific (34). 
He contends that Marx’s “Early Works,” those written prior to 1845, were a reaction to 
his historical conditions: as a young philosopher in nineteenth-century Germany, it was 
inevitable that he should have responded to Hegel. Thus, Marx’s early work, particularly 
the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, in which “the essence of man is 
the basis for all history and politics,” is an attempt to reconcile the idealism of Hegel with 
real material conditions (226). Althusser’s conception of the epistemological break is 
based on his assertion that the mature Marx broke fully from this connection to Hegel, 
abandoning the aim of establishing a humanist philosophy that addressed a universal 




what Althusser views as Marx’s most meaningful contributions. Marx’s primary 
“scientific discovery,” was, for Althusser, the establishment of what he terms Marx’s 
“theoretical anti-humanism,” which is founded on the understanding that “it is impossible 
to know anything about men except on the absolute precondition that the philosophical 
(theoretical) myth of man is reduced to ashes” (229, my emphasis). Thus, the theoretical 
foundations of Capital and other “Mature Works,” e.g. “the concepts of mode of 
production, forces of production, relations of production, superstructure, ideology, etc.,” 
are necessarily predicated on the belief that humanity can be understood not in terms of a 
universal essence, but only as an “ensemble of social relations” (243-4). 
 For Althusser, then, Marx’s relationship to philosophical humanism is to be 
considered a youthful dalliance, an affair necessary for the formation of the mature man, 
but one that must be wholly disregarded once he is wed to historical materialism. For 
other thinkers, however, the exact opposite is true: humanism is Marx’s lasting 
companion, the ideal to which he is faithful through every tempestuous theoretical 
development. One of the most eloquent advocates of this position remains Erich Fromm, 
a contemporary of Althusser, whose Marx’s Concept of Man contained, in addition to his 
own writings on Marx, the first publication in the United States of the Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts in its entirety. This work, which Althusser calls “the Marx 
furthest from Marx” (159), is, for Fromm, the key to understanding the entire body of 
Marx’s work. Contrary to Althusser, Fromm contends that “ it is impossible to 
understand his [Marx’s] concept of socialism, and his criticism of capitalism as 
developed in his later years, except on the basis of the concept of man which he 




career “the spiritual emancipation of man” (3), and the early works, particularly the 
Manuscripts, contain the most significant elaboration of what this emancipation would 
entail. Like Althusser, Fromm recognizes Marx’s philosophical debt to Hegel, 
particularly in the former’s focus on alienation: “For Marx, as for Hegel, the concept of 
alienation is based on the distinction between existence and essence, on the fact that 
man’s existence is alienated from his essence, that in reality he is not what he potentially 
is, or, to put it differently, that he is not what he ought to be, and that he ought to be that 
which he could be” (47). As Fromm goes on to explain, this alienation of human essence 
from human existence is a product of labor relations and thus forms Marx’s primary 
critique of capitalism, the system which creates these alienating labor conditions. In the 
Manuscripts, as Fromm argues, Marx establishes that what constitutes the human essence 
is the interaction of man with nature through the process of labor; for Marx, “Labor is the 
self-expression of man, an expression of his individual physical and mental powers. In 
this process of genuine activity, man develops himself, becomes himself; work is not 
only a means to an end—the product—but an end in itself, the meaningful expression of 
human energy” (41-2). Thus, what man could be, what he ought to be, is a free producer, 
a being who has control over his own labor, the fundamental means by which he realizes 
and expresses his humanity.  
 The Marx of the Manuscripts did certainly present a universal vision of humanity 
that is predicated upon the individual’s relationship to labor. He states, “The whole 
character of a species, its species-character, resides in the nature of its life activity, and 
free conscious activity constitutes the species-character of man” (328). For Marx, this 




The practical creation of an objective world, the fashioning of inorganic 
nature, is proof that man is a conscious species-being […] It is therefore in 
his fashioning of the objective that man really proves himself to be a 
species-being. Such production is his active species-life […] The object of 
labor is therefore the objectification of the species-life of man: for man 
reproduces himself not only intellectually, in his consciousness, but 
actively and actually, and he can therefore contemplate himself in the 
world he himself has created. (329) 
For Marx, the human essence, the species-being, is expressed through the individual’s 
relationship to labor. Through labor, this fashioning of nature, the individual recognizes 
herself as an integral and active part of the world in which she exists; her consciousness, 
her individuality, is shaped by the way in which she sees herself reflected back in the 
objective world around her that she has helped to create. Labor, as man’s fundamental 
“life-activity” is not just about the object created but is an end in itself; it is in the act of 
free conscious production that the individual becomes species-being.  
 Since Marx’s humanism is thus predicated upon man’s relationship to labor, the 
question of whether or not his philosophical origins continue to inform his work must be 
based on the way in which he presents this relationship throughout his career. Thus, when 
Fromm argues that “the core of the philosophy developed by the young Marx was never 
changed” (79), he is arguing that Marx remained committed to a vision of labor as the 
basis for the full development of the individual as species-being. In support of his claim 




from Capital Volume Three, in which Marx lays out what is perhaps his most 
comprehensive vision of labor organization in a socialist society:  
The realm of freedom really begins where labour determined by necessity 
and external expediency ends; it lies by its very nature beyond the sphere 
of material production proper […] Freedom, in this sphere, can consist 
only in this, that socialized man, the associated producers, govern the 
human metabolism with nature in a rational way, bringing it under their 
collective control […]; accomplishing it with the least expenditure of 
energy and in conditions most worthy and appropriate for their human 
nature. But this always remains a realm of necessity. The true realm of 
freedom, the development of human powers as an end in itself, begins 
beyond it. (959, my emphasis) 
For Fromm, this passage is the height of Marx’s humanism, the end of the alienation that 
formed the basis of his critique of capitalism. He contends that in this “new form of 
unalienated society,” man “would no longer be crippled by the alienated mode of 
production and consumption; that he would truly be the master and creator of his own 
life, and hence that he could begin to make living his main business, rather than 
producing the means for living” (60).  
 There does indeed seem to be a fundamental continuity here between the Marx of 
the Manuscripts and the Marx of Capital: the universalist language of this passage—
human nature, human powers—suggests the kind of philosophical humanism that 
Althusser was convinced Marx had broken with entirely; this is the presentation of a 




However, the nature of this continuity, as Fromm presents it, contains a glaring 
contradiction. As Fromm rightly points out, this passage from Capital does present a 
society in which there is a sharp distinction between “living” and “producing the means 
for living;” in this vision put forth by the later Marx, the true expression of the human 
essence can occur only outside the realm of necessary production. Thus, labor that is 
performed for the meeting of material needs is placed in contradistinction to human life 
activity. While Fromm argues that there is no significant philosophical break between the 
early and the late Marx, his own evaluation of the Manuscripts suggests otherwise. As he 
says, labor, in this and other early works, is presented by Marx as an “end-in-itself;” it is 
the “self-expression of man.” In short, for the early Marx, labor is life-activity—
producing the means for living is life itself, not something that occurs before living can 
properly begin. In the Manuscripts, Marx identifies as one of the primary sources of 
alienation in the capitalist system the fact that labor, for the worker, becomes “not the 
satisfaction of a need but a mere means to satisfy needs outside itself” (326). In Marx’s 
vision in Capital, there is an entire realm of human production, labor performed in the 
realm of necessity, that is to serve only as a means to an end.  
 I would thus like to propose a reading of Marx that lies somewhere between 
Althusser’s conception of the epistemological break and Fromm’s assertion of complete 
philosophical continuity. While Marx continued throughout his career to base his visions 
of a socialist society on the conception of a human essence that should be allowed to 
flourish in each individual, his understanding of the role of labor in this process of human 
emancipation underwent a significant shift. In his early works, Marx presents all 




being and thus establishes for labor a fundamental role in the full development of the 
humanity of the individual. However, in his later writings, the development of the human 
essence becomes severed from material production, culminating in his insistence in 
Capital Volume Three that labor performed in the realm of necessity must, by definition, 
serve only as the precondition, and not as the means, of fundamental human expression. 
Recognizing the continued presence of the human essence in Marx’s work is vital to any 
understanding of the end goal of Marx’s political project: Althusser’s reading of the 
“scientific” Marx incorrectly divorces his later writings from the moral imperative that 
structures his definition of a better society as one in which the essential humanity of 
every individual would be realized. Equally as important, however, is the recognition that 
Marx presents two different understandings of how the creative and productive human 
essence would achieve this realization: in eliding this difference, Fromm avoids the fact 
that a fundamental decision concerning the role of labor must be made before any 
movement towards this goal of human emancipation can be achieved.  
 Marx first establishes his notion of labor as formative human activity in the 
Manuscripts of 1844, and he carries on and elaborates this understanding in his work of 
1845, The German Ideology. In this text, he says that men  
begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to 
produce their means of subsistence […] This mode of production must not 
be considered simply as being the reproduction of the physical existence 
of individuals. Rather it is a definite form of expressing their life, a 
definite mode of life on their part. As individuals express their life, so they 




In this passage, it is clear that Marx points specifically to production performed for the 
satisfaction of material needs as a form of individual human expression; he directly 
cautions against viewing necessary production as merely a means of meeting material 
needs. As in the Manuscripts, his critique of capitalism in this text is based on the 
argument that capitalist production, which alienates the worker from his own labor, has 
severed him from his fundamental life-activity; he argues that while the separation of 
“self-activity and the production of material life” occurred in earlier periods, it is with 
capitalism that “they now diverge to such an extent that material life appears as the end, 
and what produces this material life, labour (which is now the only possible but, as we 
see, negative form of self-activity), as the means” (96, my emphasis). Because, with the 
capitalist division of labor, the worker becomes severed from his own production, and 
“man’s own deed becomes an alien power opposed to him, which enslaves him instead of 
being controlled by him” (53), labor ceases to be self-fulfilling and becomes a “negative 
form of self-activity.” For Marx, then, because human expression is tied to production, 
the only way in which individuals can “achieve self-activity” is through taking control of 
“the existing totality of productive forces”; it is through this appropriation of the 
instruments of production that the individual, who is shaped by his own acts of 
production, develops his “individual capacities” (96). It is only after this appropriation 
has occurred, when man is reunited with his own labor, that “self-activity coincide[s] 
with material life, which corresponds to the development of individuals into complete 
individuals” (97, my emphasis). Thus, for the Marx of The German Ideology, as for the 
Marx of the Manuscripts, the individual is only fully realized as a species-being through 




 While the message of Marx’s early works is overwhelmingly one that presents all 
unalienated labor as formative human activity, there is a moment in the Manuscripts 
which seems to suggest that labor performed in the realm of necessity may be 
distinguished from truly free human production. In the Manuscripts, Marx establishes the 
distinction between animal and human production, and one of these elements is that 
animals “produce only when immediate physical need compels them to do so, while man 
produces even when he is free from physical need and truly produces only in freedom 
from such need” (329, my emphasis). While Marx suggests here that true production only 
occurs when man is not concerned with meeting physical needs, I would argue that there 
is a significant difference between producing for the sole purpose of physical necessity 
and freely creating a product that meets physical needs. For Marx, alienated labor is that 
which is “not the satisfaction of a need but a mere means to satisfy needs outside itself” 
(326). This “immediate physical need” which Marx defines as driving animal production 
would be the equivalent of a human being freezing to death in the wilderness if she does 
not immediately produce shelter; however, in the case of a worker commissioned to build 
a home for another, the shelter is still a physical necessity, but it is not produced by the 
worker out of her own immediate needs but rather to fulfill a social need. If the worker is 
fulfilled in her work, performing it freely (without the compulsion to earn her own means 
of subsistence), she is performing socially necessary work that also satisfies her own need 
to reproduce herself through her labor; thus, the work is not solely a means to an end, but 
is also an end in itself. Marx is speaking here of the compulsion of the immediate 
physical need of the individual, not of all necessary material production. There is thus no 




 Marx does not begin to establish the distinction between the “realm of freedom” 
and the “realm of necessity” that will become so central to his vision in Capital Volume 
Three until several years later, in 1857-8, when he composed the notebooks which would 
later be published as The Grundrisse. Peter Beilharz argues that, in this work, Marx 
breaks with “the very labour ontology upon which his early work is based […] The 
prospect of freedom, or at least of free time, shifts beyond the sphere of labour or 
production into the realm beyond it” (599). The “labour ontology” to which Beilharz 
refers here is in line with my own reading of Marx’s early works as presenting labor as 
the formative human activity; the break from this vision of labor occurs for Beilharz in 
Marx’s discussion of advanced automation as a replacement for direct labor in The 
Grundrisse. There are certainly grounds for Beilharz’s reading. In this work, Marx argues 
that the advancement of machinery creates a situation in which the individual no longer 
relates directly to production through her labor:  
Labour no longer appears so much to be included within the production 
process; rather, the human being comes to relate more as a watchmen and 
regulator to the production process itself […] In this transformation, it is 
neither the direct human labour he himself performs, nor the time during 
which he works, but rather the appropriation of his own general productive 
power, his understanding of nature and his mastery over it by virtue of his 
presence as a social body. (284)  
Here, the act of material production, previously performed by human labor, is taken over 
by machinery. Marx does not lament this transference; instead, it is for him the grounds 




direct physical labor is freed to fully develop her human capacity: “[T]he general 
reduction of the necessary labour time to a minimum” leads to “the artistic, scientific etc. 
development of the individuals in the time set free, and with the means created, for all of 
them” (285). The freeing of the individual from direct labor, the creation of “disposable 
time,” is beneficial not just for the individual but for society as a whole: “The saving of 
labour time [is] equal to an increase of free time, i.e. time for the full development of the 
individual, which in turn reacts back upon the productive power of labour as itself the 
greatest productive power” (290, my emphasis). Thus, Marx does seem to abandon his 
earlier “labor ontology” in the sense that he shifts his focus from the development of the 
individual through her labor to a focus on what occurs in her “free time”; this free time, 
far from being equated with leisure as it is in ordinary parlance, is instead the space in 
which the individual actively develops her full creative capacities. This passage from The 
Grundrisse does seem to parallel Marx’s insistence in Capital on a division between the 
realm of necessity and the realm of freedom. Here, as in Capital, the individual develops 
herself as species-being, as a free conscious producer, only after she is freed from direct 
labor.  
However, there are indications in The Grundrisse that Marx had not yet 
committed to a complete break between necessary production and “the development of 
human powers as an end in itself” (Capital V.3 959). While the worker of The Grundrisse 
no longer relates to material production in the same way, her development is still 
intrinsically tied to her labor; it is just that her labor has changed forms. She has become 
the “watchmen and regulator” of the process; instead of being herself a tool of 




have not divorced her from the material production process entirely but have created a 
new role for her, one that allows for a more intellectual, as opposed to physical, 
engagement. Thus, when she undergoes her “full development” in her disposable time, it 
immediately “reacts back upon the productive power of labour.” She does not develop as 
an individual separated from the production process, but as a worker who continues to 
contribute to material production. This understanding leads Marx to immediately 
compromise the distinction between labor time and free time that he has himself just 
established. He explains that once the workers have appropriated their own surplus labor, 
thus controlling their own free time (that spent outside of direct production), “disposable 
time thereby ceases to have an antithetical existence” (287). As he goes on to clarify, 
“direct labour time itself cannot remain in the abstract antithesis to free time in which it 
appears from the perspective of bourgeois economy” (290). Because free time is directly 
linked to the development of the productive forces of the individual, forces which are 
then channeled back into the combined human labor force, the distinction between free 
time and labor time becomes inconsequential. The realm of freedom, then, is intertwined 
with the realm of necessity: the artistic and scientific work done by the individual in her 
“free” time is not distinct from her contributions to material production. Thus, to say, as 
Beilharz does, that Marx’s ontology has been divorced from labor and production is not 
entirely accurate. While Marx does argue in The Grundrisse that human development 
does occur when the individual is, in part, freed from direct labor, he says this with the 
understanding that the distinction between direct labor and the creative production 
performed outside the realm of necessity cannot truly be made once the worker controls 




While I do not believe that a fundamental break with Marx’s early philosophy of 
labor occurs in The Grundrisse, I believe that he establishes a foundation here for the 
break that does occur in Capital. While he has not fully committed in the earlier text to a 
break between the realms of necessity and freedom, his understanding here of the role of 
automation is parallel to what Marx sees in the latter text as the role of the entity which 
he calls the “associated producers” (Capital V.3 959). Both are predicated on the idea that 
the worker must in some sense be freed from obligations to the realm of necessity before 
she can begin to truly develop as a species-being. However, it is only in Capital that 
Marx wholly divorces individual development from necessary material production. It is 
the adoption of this distinction that fully severs the labor philosophy of the early Marx 
from that of the late Marx; in Capital, socially necessary labor ceases to be formative 
life-activity and instead becomes a means to life. Throughout his career, Marx remained 
true to a humanist agenda; in the words of Eagleton, for Marx, “there is or should be no 
ultimate point to human existence beyond its self-delighting development” (18). As Marx 
says in Capital Volume One, the ultimate goal is to create a society in which the “full and 
free development of every individual forms the ruling principle” (739). However, while 
the agenda remains consistent, Marx’s understanding of what it means to reach this goal 
undergoes a fundamental change. While in his early works, this “full and free 
development” is inseparable from necessary material production, the Marx of Capital 
sees the potential for this development only in the social spaces that exist outside of it.  
In my first chapter, I will respond to the common reading of Looking Backward 
which sees Bellamy’s utopia as failing to break with the capitalist society in which it was 




capitalist and that the ties that remain with the capitalist present represent not his failure 
to move beyond it, but the understanding he shares with Marx of the way in which the 
socialist future must employ the large-scale production and socialized labor force brought 
into being by industrial capitalism. I will argue that Bellamy, like Marx, imagines a 
society whose goal is the “full and free development” of the individual and that 
Bellamy’s understanding of how labor functions in the achievement of this goal aligns 
with that proposed in the later writings of Marx. My reading of Bellamy’s utopia will 
discuss the ways in which his society opens up the possibility of a move beyond alienated 
labor, but I will argue that his adoption of Marx’s distinction between the “realm of 
necessity” and the “realm of freedom” forecloses this possibility by creating conditions in 
which the daily activity of the individual is separated from her “self-delighting 
development.” In my second chapter, I will argue that Morris’s socialist vision in News 
from Nowhere also takes as its primary goal the “full and free development of the 
individual” but aligns, in opposition to Bellamy, with the conception of labor as 
fundamental to the development of the individual as a species-being found in Marx’s 
early works. I will further argue that in adopting this view, Morris’s utopia actively 
deconstructs the distinction between necessary and free production and that it is the 
abandonment of this distinction that leads to the eradication of alienated labor in his 
imagined future. In my conclusion, I will respond to the work of Darko Suvin, who has 
argued that the utopias of Bellamy and Morris are fundamentally compatible. For Suvin, 
Bellamy’s utopia represents a “societas rerum” (a society of things) while Morris’s 
utopia represents a “societas hominum” (a society of human relations); in short, “each 




from Nowhere, which he claims lacks a strong material foundation, Looking Backward 
cannot be understood as a hollow material shell waiting for a philosophy because it is 
already strongly informed by one of its own. Thus, any attempt to graft the understanding 
of humanity proposed by Morris onto the material conditions proposed by Bellamy would 
necessarily include a displacement of Bellamy’s philosophy. I will further argue that 
understanding how this displacement might be achieved without abandoning the material 
structures of Bellamy’s utopia may be the key to imagining a socialism which would 
grow from the material conditions of capitalism while fully separating itself from the 















CHAPTER ONE: FULFILLING THE “EDICT OF EDEN” IN LOOKING 
BACKWARD 
William Morris, in his 1889 review of Looking Backward, critiques Bellamy’s 
inability to imagine a future socialist society that is fully severed from the capitalist 
present; Bellamy, he argues, is “perfectly satisfied with modern civilization, if only the 
injustice, misery, and waste of class society can be got rid of; which half-change seems 
possible to him” (354, my emphasis). This reading of Bellamy’s utopia as incomplete in 
its transition from capitalism to socialism, as representing only a “half-change,” is one 
that is frequently echoed in modern scholarship. Simon Dentith, while acknowledging the 
sincerity of Bellamy’s moral commitment to socialism, argues that he fails to imagine a 
significant “transformation of human relations” (144). Likewise, Alexander MacDonald 
sees Bellamy’s utopia as expressing a “basic acceptance” of capitalist society’s “essential 
features” (82), and Matthew Beaumont claims that Bellamy’s vision, while ostensibly 
socialist, most closely resembles “a more humane and morally acceptable species of 
capitalism” (30). In this chapter, I will argue that Bellamy does imagine a radical 
transformation of human relations and that his ties to capitalism represent not a failure to 
move beyond it, but a necessary employment of the large-scale production that arose with 
capitalism for the creation of a socialist future: in his utopia, Bellamy employs, as Marx 
imagined in Capital Volume One, the “new productive power, which is intrinsically a 
collective one” (443), which necessarily arises with capitalism, to distinctly socialist 
ends. I will argue that Bellamy’s use of an organized collective labor force as a highly 
efficient means for meeting the needs of society as a whole aligns with Marx’s vision of a 




and Marx significantly reimagines the human relations of capitalism in its understanding 
of cooperation as the foundation of society. I will further argue that Bellamy adopts as the 
end goal of his societal transformation the “full and free development” of the individual, 
which Marx argues should form the “ruling principle” of any “higher form of society” 
(Capital V.1 739). I will align Bellamy’s approach to the achievement of this end with 
that found specifically in the later works of Marx, which establish a distinction between 
productive activity performed in the “realm of freedom” and that performed in the “realm 
of necessity” (Capital V.3 959). An examination of how this distinction manifests itself in 
Bellamy’s utopian vision will show that any attempt to relegate necessary material 
production to a separate realm inevitably allows for the continuation of alienated labor as 
it is defined in the early works of Marx. My purpose in aligning Bellamy’s utopia with 
Marx’s writings is thus two-fold. In studying how Bellamy’s vision employs the 
productive forces that arose with capitalism, I will highlight the potential for a post-
capitalist society to emerge from the material conditions of the present, and in examining 
the problems inherent in his creation of a distinct realm of necessity, I will explore the 
consequences that arise from a structural divide between individual fulfillment and the 
meeting of social needs. In aligning these aspects of Bellamy’s society with the theories 
of Marx, I will show both the potential and the limitations of the latter as they may arise 
in practical application.  
 The world of Boston in the year 2000, the stage of Bellamy’s utopian 
speculation, is unveiled to the reader through the eyes of its nineteenth-century 
protagonist, Julian West. West, a wealthy young Bostonian, enters a mesmeric trance in 




until he is found in the year 2000 by the Leete family, not having aged a day due to the 
preservative nature of the trance. Upon awakening, he finds himself in a world very 
different from the one he left, and it is the Leete family who educate him on the nature of 
his surroundings. One of the first things to be elucidated by the family patriarch, Dr. 
Leete, is how the world in which West finds himself came to be. As he explains, private 
economic enterprise has been eliminated through a process of “industrial evolution” in 
which the great monopolies of the nineteenth century were combined into one productive 
force:  
Early in the last century the evolution was completed by the final 
consolidation of the entire capital of the nation. The industry and 
commerce of the country, ceasing to be conducted by a set of irresponsible 
corporations and syndicates of private persons at their caprice and for their 
profit, were intrusted to a single syndicate representing the people, to be 
conducted in the common interest for the common profit. The nation, that 
is to say, organized as the one great business corporation in which all other 
corporations were absorbed; it become the one capitalist in the place of all 
the other capitalists […] The epoch of trusts had ended in The Great Trust. 
(33) 
Bellamy’s language here certainly lends itself to the criticism that his utopia has not 
broken with the fundamental elements of capitalism. The concept of the nation as “one 
great business corporation” sounds, at first blush, more like an authoritarian right-wing 
paradise than a socialist one. Bellamy, in fact, never describes his future society as 




accompany this “industrial evolution.” The transition of the means of production from 
private to public ownership was accomplished not by an act of political revolution by the 
laboring classes, but by the peaceful action of one unified party that was comprised 
“equally of all classes” (149). Scholars like Beaumont and Phillip Wegner are 
undoubtedly correct in their assertion that Bellamy was ambivalent toward socialism and 
eschewed revolutionary politics. Bellamy himself stated that that word socialism was one 
he “could never well stomach,” and that socialism would never be accepted in the United 
States because it “smells to the average American of petroleum, suggests the red flag, 
with all manner of sexual novelties, and an abusive tone about God and religion” 
(Wegner 69). His account in Looking Backward of the way in which his utopian society 
comes to be clearly forecloses the possibility of any meaningful change being 
accomplished by means of class struggle. As Dr. Leete tells West, “The labor parties, as 
such, never could have accomplished anything on a large or permanent scale” (149). It is 
only through the mutual recognition by all classes of the need to organize society “on a 
higher ethical basis” that a just order is brought into being (149).  
Why, then, is Bellamy’s utopia even considered socialist? Why debate whether or 
not Bellamy’s utopia achieves a full transition to socialism when that seemingly was not 
even its intention? Bellamy himself realized that, even with his aversion to the term 
socialism, he seems to “out-socialize the socialists” with his “radicalness of opinions” 
(Wegner 69). Furthermore, Bellamy’s novel was widely accepted as a socialist vision. In 
fact, as Beaumont shows, many of Looking Backward’s readers interpreted it as “the 
socialist bible of reconstruction, a kind of guidebook to post-capitalist society” (28). 




indication “that there are a great many people who are hopeful in regards to Socialism” 
(353). Most importantly, as I will show, despite Bellamy’s choice of language, his vision 
of a just society fundamentally aligns with that of Marx; regardless of its intention, 
Bellamy’s utopia acts as a proving ground for many of the ideas proposed in Marx’s 
works. In short, while Bellamy may have been ambivalent towards socialism as he saw it 
enacted in his historical moment, his utopia is structured by its core philosophies and 
dictates.  
One of Bellamy’s primary objections to socialism was not its end goal, but rather 
the way in which that end was achieved. Bellamy’s vision of a seamless transition to a 
new social order, enacted by and for the whole of society, is in clear opposition to Marx’s 
vision of the rise of a revolutionary proletariat. It is Bellamy’s focus on the evolutionary, 
as opposed to the revolutionary, development of society that is often turned to as a sign of 
his inability to significantly break with capitalism. As MacDonald argues, “Bellamy’s 
view that the existing society could evolve into a better society implies a basic acceptance 
of the former’s essential features” (82). For Beaumont, Bellamy’s means of social 
transition suggests his belief that capitalism itself could, under the right conditions, solve 
the “social question,” and he views Bellamy’s reliance on economic concentration as the 
employment of an essentially capitalist strategy (36-7). However, it must be remembered 
that Marx’s vision of the future was not one predicated solely on rupture. While Marx 
believed that political revolution was a necessity, he also believed that a socialist society 
could only grow from the material foundations constructed by the organic movements of 
capitalist forces. In fact, Bellamy’s understanding of the role of economic concentration, 




final combination of all production into one rationally organized force (32-3), is an 
almost precise transposition of Marx. The latter writes in Capital Volume One:  
Everywhere the increased scale of industrial establishments is a starting-
point for a more comprehensive organization of the collective labour of 
many people, for a broader development of their material motive forces, 
i.e. for the progressive transformation of the isolated processes of 
production […] into socially combined and scientifically arranged 
processes of production. (780) 
Marx believed that this increasing accumulation of wealth would result in a larger 
redundant working population and therefore increased misery, followed by increased 
unrest which would ultimately lead to political action by the proletariat (929). Bellamy, 
on the other hand, while also acknowledging that the society shaped by the great 
monopolies was “oppressive and intolerable,” envisions the people collectively realizing 
the potential of the “prodigious increase of efficiency” created by these concentrations 
and acting peacefully to appropriate the means of production for the collective good (32-
3). However, while the two thinkers differ fundamentally concerning the way in which 
the private concentrations of capital would be appropriated for collective use, they share 
an understanding of the evolutionary quality inherent in the creation of a socialized 
means of production. Therefore, Bellamy’s vision of “industrial evolution” need not be 
read as an acceptance of the essential features of capitalism or as an employment of 
capitalist strategies. Rather, it marks an alignment with Marx’s vision of the way in 
which the material conditions created by capitalism would necessarily be employed as the 




It is arguably this understanding of the way in which a socialist society must arise 
from a capitalist one that leads Bellamy to employ the language of the latter to describe 
the structures of the former. For, despite his employment of capitalist terminology, the 
social structures and human relations of capitalism have been thoroughly supplanted in 
Bellamy’s utopia by ones built on socialist principles. Many critics do not share this 
view. In a comparison between News from Nowhere and Looking Backward, Dentith 
argues that while Morris “anticipates no less than a transformation of human relations,” 
Bellamy is limited by “arrangements that do not go as far as Morris;” Bellamy, he claims, 
is trapped in the trope of inversion, able to imagine a new society only in terms of the 
previous one (144). For Raymond Williams, Bellamy’s focus on economic organization 
overrules “questions of substantially different social relations and human motives” (57). 
Similarly, MacDonald argues that Bellamy’s insistence on economic efficiency creates a 
utopia based on values that are “essentially quantitative” and labels him an “intellectual 
descendent” of the famous Utilitarian Jeremy Bentham (84). For all of these scholars, 
Bellamy’s utopia lacks a significant reimagining of the human experience: his envisioned 
changes are economic, focused on a readjustment of quantitative elements, and 
overshadowed by ideologies of the past. However, while Bellamy does focus on 
economic development as the means by which his new society comes into being, these 
material conditions are predicated on a significant change in human relations from 
competitive and individualistic to cooperative and social. As Dr. Leete explains to West, 
every citizen of the twenty-first century United States is granted an equal share of the 
national wealth because they have recognized “the solidarity of the race and the 




recognition of solidarity is based not on an abstract moral conception but rather on an 
understanding of the reality of human interaction. As Leete goes on to explain,  
There is no such thing in a civilized society as self-support […] As men 
grow more civilized, and the subdivision of occupations and services is 
carried out, a complex mutual interdependence becomes the universal rule 
[…] The necessity of mutual dependence should imply the duty and 
guarantee of mutual support; and that it did not in your day constituted the 
essential cruelty and unreason of your system. (77, my emphasis) 
There is no doubt that we see here a fundamental shift from the capitalist understanding 
of individual autonomy and competition. Bellamy’s utopia is built on the principles of 
equality, cooperation, and mutual support. In light of this, it is particularly strange that 
MacDonald would associate Bellamy with Bentham, whose conception of human 
interaction is based on the absolute supremacy of self-interest divorced from social 
relationships. As Marx says, for Bentham, interaction between individuals is predicated 
on the idea that the “only force bringing them together, and putting them in relation with 
each other, is the selfishness, gain, and private interest of each” (Capital V. 1 280). 
Bellamy’s utopia is an unequivocal refutation of this understanding of humanity; in his 
imagined society, self-interest is realized as inseparable from collective interests. The 
illusion of self-sufficiency has been eradicated, and all individuals operate under the 
knowledge that they are functioning as part of a social whole. This realization of human 
connectedness not as an abstract conception, but as a material reality, parallels Marx, who 
in The German Ideology makes clear that the “common interest does not exist merely in 




division of labor (52). As he goes on to say in Capital Volume One, the inability of the 
individual to realize this mutual interdependence is a product of capitalist production, 
which, while creating a real human connection through collective labor, obscures this 
connection by presenting it as “a plan drawn up by the capitalist”; thus, the workers’ 
interrelation appears to them as externally constructed (449-51). It is only after capitalism 
ceases to obscure this real connection that the worker “strips off the fetters of his 
individuality, and develops the capability of his species” (447).  For Bellamy, as for 
Marx, the process of creating a socialist society requires a new philosophy of human 
relations that is predicated on the essential collectivity that already exists in reality. While 
Bellamy might employ the language of capitalism, his utopia has stripped away the 
impediments of capitalist relations, allowing the individual to recognize herself for what 
she truly is: a social being.  
 Just as this philosophy of human relations is predicated on the reality of mutual 
interdependence, the philosophy, in turn, acts upon real material conditions. The 
economic structures of Bellamy’s utopia cannot be separated from the guiding principle 
of cooperation. According to Leete, in the twenty-first century view, the capitalists of the 
nineteenth-century were doomed to failure because of their understanding of human 
relations: “Selfishness was their only science, and in industrial production, selfishness is 
suicide. Competition, which is the instinct of selfishness, is another word for dissipation 
of energy” (144). For Leete, who acts as the voice of Bellamy’s enlightened utopian 
population, it is capitalism’s insistence on the role of self-interest and competition that 
creates a prodigious waste of human productive power. This parallels Marx, who argues 




most outrageous squandering of labour-power and the social means of production” (667). 
For both Bellamy and Marx, it is the driving force of competition that undermines the 
productivity of the capitalist system; thus, for both thinkers, the elimination of this 
motive force is key to the creation of a truly productive society. In Bellamy’s future 
society, they have realized that “combination is the secret of efficient production” and 
have utilized this understanding to create a productive force capable of keeping all its 
citizens in material comfort (144). This replacement of competition by cooperation, while 
an economic strategy, cannot be separated from a fundamental shift in human relations. 
Competition can only be eliminated in practice by also eradicating its root cause: 
selfishness. This requires an ontological reimaging; the individual must cease to be 
viewed as an autonomous entity, driven by self-interest, and instead be understood as part 
of an interconnected societal whole. Thus, Bellamy’s focus on economic efficiency, 
which critics like MacDonald and Williams have seen as supplanting concerns of human 
relations, is intrinsically tied to a fundamental philosophical change. To say, as Dentith 
does, that Bellamy does not imagine a “transformation of human relations” is to ignore 
the fact that his society is predicated on a new image of humanity as a collective, 
cooperative force, an image that parallels Marx’s understanding of life in a socialist 
society.  
In addition to the eschewal of revolutionary politics and the focus on economic 
efficiency, the representation of consumption in Bellamy’s utopia has also been 
understood to compromise its socialist status. In Bellamy’s twenty-first century Boston, 
buying and selling between individuals is considered “essentially anti-social” because it 




money; instead, each citizen, at birth, is granted a “credit card” which represents their 
equal share of the national wealth as it is determined annually. The nation is sole 
employer and producer, so all goods are considered products of the combined productive 
effort of society and are thus purchased not from individuals, but from the nation; goods 
are made available through a highly-organized system of “public storehouses” found in 
every community (51). Despite this radical change in the way in which consumption is 
carried out, both MacDonald and Beaumont have argued that the portrayal of 
consumption in Bellamy’s future society links it with the capitalist present in which it 
was written. For both scholars, representations of consumption take precedence over 
representations of production in Bellamy’s novel. As MacDonald argues, the novel “lacks 
any description of the process of production,” but “pays a good deal of attention to the 
machinery of circulation” (78). Likewise, Beaumont claims that the “processes of 
production are effectively invisible” and that the citizens of Bellamy’s utopia are “by 
vocation consumers rather than producers” (39). Both scholars conclude that Looking 
Backward is marked by the continued presence of commodity fetishism; in the words of 
MacDonald, the novel showcases “the endless consumption of fetishized goods, objects 
that magically seem to produce themselves” (80). Thus, they argue, Bellamy’s utopia is 
more capitalist than socialist because it hides production while glorifying the 
consumption of commodities; further, because production remains hidden, the 
commodities still embody the fetishized character of the goods produced in the capitalist 
system.  
It is true that in his exploration of twenty-first century Boston, West spends a 




image of this establishment takes on a distinctly utopian character: “I was in a vast hall 
full of light […] [I]n the centre of the hall, a magnificent fountain played, cooling the 
atmosphere to a delicious freshness with its spray […] Around the fountain was a space 
occupied with chairs and sofas, on which many persons were seated conversing” (60). 
The description of the store as a site of both aesthetic pleasure and social engagement 
makes clear that shopping in Bellamy’s utopia is not a briskly utilitarian function but an 
activity in which one can delight. Furthermore, Leete assures West (and thus Bellamy 
assures the reader) that while the national wealth is distributed equally to every citizen, it 
is so vast as to allow everyone to get “whatever he desires whenever he desires it” (51). 
Since there is no scarcity, parsimony, “having lost its utility,” is no longer considered a 
virtue; as Leete says, the “nation is rich, and does not wish the people to deprive 
themselves of any good thing” (52). There is no doubt, then, some validity to the readings 
of Bellamy’s utopia that mark it as enthusiastically consumption-driven. It is also true 
that West, and thus the reader, is given no direct access to a site of production; in one 
brief scene, West visits a distribution warehouse (the shoppers in Bellamy’s utopia chose 
from samples of goods, and then the actual products are distributed by these warehouses 
directly to their home), but this is the only definitive image of the vast labor structure that 
is the source of all the national wealth being consumed. Furthermore, while the narrative 
focuses on the beauty of the site of consumption, the site of labor is noticeably utopian 
only in its “prodigiously multiplied efficiency;” it is not a “vast hall full of light,” but a 
“gigantic mill” (106). Thus, if we consider West’s physical journey of exploration 




argument that consumption is prized over production and that goods appear “magically” 
divorced from the labor that creates them, may certainly be accepted.  
However, while West himself is not privy to a direct view of the labor process, 
the very structure of Bellamy’s imagined society forecloses the possibility that labor is 
hidden from the view of his utopian citizens; thus, the reading of Bellamy’s utopia as 
enmeshed in the capitalist world of commodity fetishism is compromised. As Marx 
explains the process of commodity fetishism in Capital Volume One, the “mysterious 
character of the commodity-form” is created by the fact that, in a capitalist system, 
commodities take on the social relations that exist in reality among the producers; the 
labor process, the real source of animate connections and relationships, is obscured by the 
exchange of commodities, which act in the market as “autonomous figures endowed with 
a life of their own” (165). Therefore, the “veil is not removed from the countenance of 
the social life-process, i.e. the process of material production, until it becomes production 
by freely associated men, and stands under their rational and planned control” (173). 
While MacDonald and Beaumont see this veil as still being firmly in place in Bellamy’s 
utopia, his society is a rationally-organized collective of voluntary workers of the very 
nature that Marx here imagines. As I have argued, Bellamy’s major philosophical move 
is his structuring of social relations around the acceptance of an essential human 
interconnectedness that stems from material relations of production. In his utopian 
society, the citizens comprise a vast labor force called the “industrial army” that carries 
out all production; while some members may chose at a certain point to pursue 
professions not directly tied to material production, every citizen is educated concerning 




thorough study of the National industrial system, with the history and rudiments of all the 
great trades, is an essential part of our educational system […] Our schools are constantly 
visiting our workshops, and often are taken on long excursions to inspect particular 
industrial enterprises” (39). While the purpose of this component of education (which 
Leete assures West does not overshadow the “intellectual culture” of the schools) is 
primarily to prepare the citizen to choose an occupation for which he is best suited1, it 
also serves to connect Bellamy’s Bostonians with the intricacies of the process that 
produces their material environment. In addition to this educational component, all male 
citizens, before entering their chosen industrial profession or pursuing further training in 
the “professional schools,” must serve for three years as “unskilled or common laborers,” 
a period in which they are expected to perform a variety of socially-necessary duties (41-
2). This serves to further connect the (male) members of Bellamy’s utopia to its material 
foundations, giving them more practical knowledge of the processes that underlie the 
creation of their nation’s vast material wealth. As a member of the industrial army, every 
citizen is expected to have an understanding of the way in which the collective work 
force functions. Thus, Bellamy’s society can be said, returning to the words of Marx, to 
truly commit itself to lifting the “veil” from the “countenance of the social life-process.” 
While Bellamy’s reader, seeing through the eyes of West, may be blind to the specifics of 
the production process, the citizens of his utopia are not; the goods they purchase do not 
just “mysteriously” appear as fetishized commodities do in the capitalist system.  
                                                             
1 I must note here that my choice of the masculine pronoun has significance. While women are also 
members of the industrial army, and seemingly undergo the same education, they are greatly limited 




Furthermore, while goods still embody exchange-value in Bellamy’s utopia, it is 
the creation of use-values that drives production; thus, there is a decisive reversal from 
the way in which goods are produced in a capitalist system. As Marx explains, “Use-
values are produced by capitalists only because and in so far as they form the material 
substratum of exchange-value, are the bearers of exchange-value” (CV.1 293). Because 
the capitalist is primarily concerned with the valorization process, with the making of 
more capital, he is largely unconcerned with the social utility of the goods that are 
incidentally produced during this process. In Bellamy’s Boston, because there are no 
individual producers or markets for the buying and selling of goods, the production of 
use-values is no longer subjugated to the production of exchange-value. Goods must still 
be understood as commodities in Bellamy’s utopia: they do take on an abstract 
quantifiable value. However, because all production is carried out as a cooperative social 
venture, and the profit motive which arises with competitive production is removed, the 
exchange-value of a commodity is derived solely from the amount of socialized labor 
which is employed in producing it (109). Because it is the collective force of workers 
which controls the means of production, there is no outside entity to extract surplus-
value; exchange-value thus becomes a direct representation of what Marx calls the 
“socially necessary labour-time” required by society in the production of a commodity 
(CV.1 129). In order for both production and distribution to be collectively and rationally 
organized for the meeting of social needs, both labor and the goods produced must be 
considered in the abstract: exchange-value thus loses its primary character and becomes a 




Commodities have also largely lost their fetishized character for the consumer. As 
Leete explains, in a society in which goods have ceased to represent monetary value, 
“accumulations of personal property are merely burdensome the moment they exceed 
what adds to the real comfort” (69). Since exchange-value has become only a necessary 
means of organization, use-value has been restored as the means by which goods are 
evaluated. Once goods have ceased to represent money, they again assume their own 
“sensuous properties” and are purchased for the comfort and enjoyment they provide. 
Each citizen may use her allotted share of the national wealth in any way she chooses; 
because every individual can easily provide for her immediate physical needs and still 
have much left over, the use of the remainder is guided by the personal interests of each. 
One may spend it on “pretty clothes,” another on an “elaborate table,” but, as Leete’s 
daughter Edith says, nothing is done for the purpose of “ostentation” but is always “a 
matter of taste” (64). Furthermore, while personal luxury is not discouraged, the social 
character of existence in Bellamy’s utopia guides not just the process of production but 
also the act of consumption; as Leete explains, much of the surplus wealth is voluntarily 
spent, not on individual pleasures, but on “public works and pleasures in which all share 
[…] and in providing on a vast scale for the recreations of the people:” “At home we 
have comfort, but the splendor of our life is, on its social side, that which we share with 
our fellows” (143). While all purchases are guided by an evaluation of use-value, a fact in 
itself marking a significant break with consumption under capitalism, consumption is 
further guided by the underlying socialist principles of collective living. Thus, while 
consumption may be celebrated in Bellamy’s utopia, its character has been radically 




I have thus far attempted to establish that Looking Backward presents a utopian 
vision that is built on the material conditions of capitalism while breaking with its 
ideological foundations and establishing a new philosophical basis for human relations; 
the employment of the collective labor force created by capitalist modes of production in 
a cooperative manner for the public good is, I have argued, in line with Marx’s 
conception of the way in which a socialist society would grow from a capitalist one, 
despite the absence of political revolution in Bellamy’s vision. I will now turn to an 
examination of the way in which this collective labor force is organized and employed to 
establish its connection to Marx’s vision of a socialist future. Bellamy’s “industrial army” 
has been derided by many critics for its obviously militant associations. Morris argued 
that while Bellamy “tells us that every man is free to choose his occupation and that work 
is no burden to anyone, the impression which he produces is that of a huge standing 
army, tightly drilled, compelled by some mysterious fate to unceasing anxiety for the 
production of wares” (356). Writing from a twentieth-century perspective, Williams 
associates Bellamy’s organization of labor with a “Stalinist version of the bureaucratic 
party” (60), and, more recently, Samuel Haber has labeled Bellamy’s approach to 
economic organization “thoroughly authoritarian” (433). I believe we again have a 
situation, as with Bellamy’s continued usage of capitalist terminology, in which his 
chosen language obscures the real meaning of his vision. While everyone must serve in 
the industrial army in some capacity, Bellamy imagines this service not as obligatory 
adherence to an authoritarian command but rather as the voluntary fulfillment of a social 
duty. For Bellamy, the usage of the term “army” implies not compulsory obedience but 




in which every individual is forced to work in order to survive, the provision that every 
citizen is provided for equally from the social wealth, regardless of the nature of his 
contribution, removes this self-interested compulsion to labor. Thus, the labor of the 
individual is recognized for what it is: a contribution to the collective welfare of society. 
As I have argued, this recognition of the role of each individual as part of an 
interconnected whole marks an ontological shift that changes the nature of human 
relations. It is with an understanding of this ontological shift that participation in the 
industrial army must be considered. The individual who genuinely understands herself as 
an intrinsic part of a social whole need not be coerced into service; her participation is not 
external to her, but is an element of her essential existence as a social being. As Leete 
makes clear, the sense of duty felt by the citizens of Bellamy’s utopia is not based on an 
abstract conception of national unity (though the continued usage of the term “patriotism” 
admittedly seems to suggest this) but is instead the product of a larger understanding of 
human connection; as he explains, the rule that everyone in their society must work is an 
extension of “the law of nature—the edict of Eden” and thus their system is “the logical 
outcome of the operation of human nature under rational conditions” (68). While the 
phrase “edict of Eden” implies a religious element clearly eschewed by Marx, Bellamy’s 
understanding of this connection between humanity and labor echoes the Marx of 
Capital, who describes labor as “the everlasting nature-imposed condition of human 
existence” (290). Thus, the law that everyone must work is not an imposition by an 
authoritarian regime but a recognition by all the members of society of the fundamental 




Bellamy’s utopia, as a way in which its members willingly embrace their shared 
humanity.  
As Morris notes in the above quotation, Bellamy does tell us that every citizen is 
allowed to choose the work for which he or she is best suited (as long as that work is 
properly gendered) and that work is no longer viewed as a burden. The educational 
system under Bellamy’s utopia is designed to provide its members with ample 
opportunity to learn about all trades so that they may choose the one for which they feel 
they are best suited. While the administration is tasked with assuring that the necessary 
number of workers are allotted to each trade, and the worker may sometimes have to take 
his second choice of occupation for some time, he may switch to his first-choice trade 
later, when the space becomes available (40-1). Furthermore, any citizen wishing to 
pursue a “professional” occupation, such as science, medicine, or music, is eligible to 
attend an institution of “higher liberal learning” (43). While Bellamy’s utopia does seem 
to genuinely create conditions that allow the worker to freely choose his occupation, the 
question of whether or not he has created a society in which work is no longer a burden is 
one that requires further examination. For Morris, who believes that labor should be a 
source of pleasure and personal fulfillment, Bellamy appears to seek only to make labor 
“tolerable” by “decreas[ing] the amount of it” (357). It is true that Bellamy focuses on the 
reduction of labor time as a necessary component of his utopian vision; every member of 
the industrial army serves only twenty-four years; he is educated until the age of twenty-
one and goes into retirement at the age of forty-five (37). Furthermore, one of the ways in 
which the administration makes arduous occupations, such as mining, attractive to 




most agreeable circumstances” require longer working hours (40). However, this is not, 
as Morris suggests, the only way in which labor is made attractive to the citizens of 
Bellamy’s utopia. The organization of labor imagined by Bellamy is predicated on the 
belief that individuals have a wide variety of interests and aptitudes; thus, all occupations, 
even the most demanding, can be carried out by “persons having natural tastes for them” 
(40). In Bellamy’s conception, the shortening of the working day is only an extra 
incentive to those who already have some desire to perform the task. Furthermore, the 
balancing of working hours is based largely on a rational consideration of physical 
health: the text implies that it is those occupations which will most quickly wear on the 
physical well-being of the worker (like mining) that are subject to the shortest hours. 
There is no doubt, however, that the primary way in which labor is made attractive to the 
worker of Bellamy’s utopia is through the sense of self-fulfillment that arises from 
performing an essential social duty. As Leete explains to West, it is the “inspiration of 
duty” and the “passion for humanity” within their workforce that creates “the ardor of 
self-devotion which animates its members” (56-7). The individual, viewing himself as an 
integral part of a greater social whole, does not begrudgingly carry out his employment 
but is inspired to do so and is passionate in his labor. The sense of solidarity that 
underlies Bellamy’s utopia “animates” each worker: his work in the service of his fellows 
fills him with life. The worker of this imagined twenty-first century realizes, in the words 
of the early Marx, that “what I create from myself I create for society, conscious of 
myself as a social being” (Manuscripts 350). As a conscious social being, the individual 
finds fulfillment and pleasure in his labor because it further connects him to those for 




So, Bellamy’s society does not simply seek to reduce the amount of labor 
performed, as Morris contends; however, his utopian vision is shaped by a philosophy 
that greatly limits the role of labor and significantly undermines the potential of his 
radically reimagined system of human relations. While Bellamy presents labor as not 
merely an unpleasant obligation to be minimized as much as possible, he also makes 
clear that labor performed to meet the material needs of society, even when made 
attractive, is the foundation, not the source, of individual self-fulfillment. As explained by 
Dr. Leete:  
[T]he labor we have to render as our part in securing for the nation the 
means of a comfortable physical existence is by no means regarded as the 
most important, the most interesting, or the most dignified employment of 
our powers. We look upon it as a necessary duty to be discharged before 
we can fully devote ourselves to the higher exercise of our faculties, the 
intellectual and spiritual enjoyments and pursuits which alone mean life. 
(115) 
He goes on to say that while everything is done to make labor attractive, and that labor is 
“not usually irksome, and is often inspiring,” labor’s true value is that it provides the 
material basis that allows for the pursuit of “higher and larger activities” which are “the 
main business of existence” (115). This unequivocal distinction between labor done in 
service of the collective and individual productive activity is one that distinctly aligns 
with the Marx of Capital. In Volume Three, he directly discusses the role of labor in a 




The realm of freedom really begins where labour determined by necessity 
and external expediency ends; it lies by its very nature beyond the sphere 
of material production proper. Just as the savage must wrestle with nature 
to satisfy his needs, to maintain and reproduce his life, so must civilized 
man […] This realm of natural necessity expands with his development, 
because his needs do too; but the productive forces to satisfy these expand 
at the same time. Freedom, in this sphere, can consist only in this, that 
socialized man, the associated producers, govern the human metabolism 
with nature in a rational way, bringing it under their collective control 
instead of being dominated by it as a blind power; accomplishing it with 
the least expenditure of energy and in conditions most worthy and 
appropriate for their human nature. But this always remains a realm of 
necessity. The true realm of freedom, the development of human powers as 
an end in itself, begins beyond it. The reduction of the working day is the 
basic prerequisite. (959, my emphasis) 
While it has been my intention throughout this chapter to establish an alignment between 
Marx and Bellamy, it is the philosophical continuity of these passages that is, for me, the 
most striking. Both thinkers clearly put forth a future vision in which the “realm of 
necessity” is provided for by a rationally organized collective force and the true 
development of human powers occurs outside of this realm. Material production serves 
only as a foundation for a higher purpose, the allowance of the individual’s ability to 




A further examination of Bellamy’s utopia will reveal the problems inherent in 
this distinction between the “realm of necessity” and the “realm of freedom.” This fissure 
between necessity and freedom sets up two others that compromise Bellamy’s utopian 
project: one between the state and the individual and one between manual and intellectual 
labor. As I have argued, Bellamy’s utopia transcends capitalist social relations through its 
portrayal of the individual as a social being, as an intrinsic part of the social whole; 
furthermore, he acknowledges that this connection is not founded on an abstract 
conception but is actively established through the individual’s productive contributions. 
The realization of this connection means, in Bellamy’s vision, that the individual is 
inspired by a “passion for humanity” that positions her work to be a means of self-
fulfillment. However, Bellamy’s insistence that it is not through the work done for the 
collective that the individual truly develops her humanity undermines his utopian vision 
of the social being. This insistence suggests that the worker’s life is divided into two 
parts: the work she performs for society’s benefit and the individualized activities she 
performs for her own fulfillment. While throughout most of the novel, Bellamy insists 
that the labor performed in the industrial army is a source of individual fulfillment, by the 
end of the novel he begins to equivocate: “work is not usually irksome, and is often 
inspiring.” Bellamy sets up the potential for all necessary labor to be made individually 
meaningful by the understanding of material production as an expression of the laborer’s 
social being, but his later presentation of the social realm of necessity as primarily a 
means to an end significantly blocks this potential.  
In addition to creating a problematic barrier between the individual and society, 




barrier be placed between two distinct types of production performed in these realms. 
Furthermore, in the conception of both Bellamy and Marx, these types of production need 
not only be distinguished from one another but must also be unequally valued, the latter 
prized over the former. Even establishing such a barrier seems a futile project; as Marx 
himself notes, the realm of necessity is a moving target: it “expands with his [man’s] 
development, because his needs do to.” How does one even articulate which production 
is done out of necessity? For Bellamy, this realm of necessity becomes all work 
performed in the service of providing a “comfortable physical existence;” necessary 
production in Bellamy’s utopia is by no means limited to what could be considered 
necessity. Leete tells West that the nation “does not wish the people to deprive 
themselves of any good thing” (52); their society is one that encourages comfort and the 
enjoyment of material goods. Since all goods consumed are produced by the same 
collective labor force, this means that much of the energy of that body must be spent on 
material production. This material production becomes, for Bellamy, largely equated to 
manual labor. Earlier in the novel, Bellamy suggests that there is no distinction of value 
between kinds of labor in his utopia; all contributions are viewed as equal. Leete, 
explaining to West that there is no longer any shame in waiting tables, claims that “there 
is recognized no sort of difference between the dignity of the different sorts of work 
required by the nation” (92). However, establishing a distinction between manual and 
intellectual labor problematizes this statement. In Bellamy’s construction, an individual 
may choose, after his three-year service as a common laborer, to pursue a higher 
education and thus serve the nation with his “brains” rather than his “hands:” these are 




While these workers are still considered to serve the nation, they are not engaged directly 
in material production. Their work instead aligns with what Leete describes as the 
“higher and larger” intellectual activities that supposedly are carried out only after one 
has rendered his service to the nation, “those scientific, artistic, literary, or scholarly 
interests which make leisure the one thing valuable to their possessors” (115). The 
problem here is apparent: In a society in which intellectual and manual labor in service of 
the nation are supposed to be of equal worth, how can intellectual pursuits, when 
performed in the individual’s “leisure” time, be defined as more valuable than any other 
activity? How does, for instance, the scientific activity performed in the service of the 
nation differ from the scientific activity performed in one’s leisure time? How is the 
former considered equivalent to manual labor while the latter is considered superior?  
This blatant contradiction exposes a crack in Bellamy’s vision of labor equality. It 
becomes clear, in his attempt to distinguish between activities performed in the realm of 
necessity and those performed in the realm of freedom, that no such distinction can 
actually be made; in the case of intellectual pursuits, they are the same activities, 
performed on either side of an arbitrary line. It is thus further revealed that the distinction 
he is actually making, despite his assertions to the contrary, is not one between service to 
the nation and individual “free” time, but one between physical and intellectual 
contributions, between those who labor with their “hands” and those who labor with their 
“brains.” While these contributions may be equal in “dignity” on the social scale, 
Bellamy makes clear that it is the latter pursuits “which alone mean life” (115).  
Bellamy’s society ensures that all its citizens are provided with the means to enjoy 




having no social duties until the age of twenty-one. In response to West’s concern that 
such a complete education would leave the young people entering the workforce 
disinclined to pursue any kind of manual labor, Leete explains that the purpose of this 
education is not to prepare one for a particular kind of work; instead, “the highest 
education is deemed necessary to fit a man merely to live” (129). In this way, Bellamy’s 
society is focused on producing what Marx calls “fully developed human beings” (CV.1 
614). The worker is no longer the “one-sided implement” he becomes in capitalist 
production (CV.1 460), but is free to develop a full range of human capacities. However, 
the devaluing of manual labor undermines this process of full development; instead of 
viewing the labor performed by much of his society in the service of providing for social 
needs as part of this process of development, Bellamy effectively precludes it. Thus, in 
Bellamy’s conception, the average worker’s daily activity is separated from his growth as 
a human being.  
It is likely that Marx did not intend for the “realm of necessity” to be defined as 
broadly as Bellamy’s utopia imagines it. As Eagleton argues, for Marx, “we are most 
human and least like other animals when we produce freely, gratuitously, independent of 
any immediate material need. Freedom for Marx is a kind of creative superabundance 
over what is materially essential” (6, my emphasis). While Marx may have intended that 
only “immediate” and “essential” needs must be met before the individual can begin to 
produce freely, there is no practical way to define what constitutes either of these terms 
on a social scale. In Bellamy’s utopia, a life full of comfort and beauty is considered a 
necessity; it is the bare minimum of life allowed. Thus, all production in service of this 




“material production proper” becomes devalued as a mere means to an end is that the 
continual expansion of the “realm of natural necessity” leads to an increasing variety of 
labor that is divorced from the realm of freedom. Further, Marx’s insistence that labor 
performed in the realm of necessity be accomplished with “the least expenditure of 
energy” becomes problematic in light of his earlier assertion in Capital Volume One that 
the labor process should unite the mental and physical capacities of the worker (643). 
Can the worker, who is to expend the least amount of energy possible in the production 
of social necessities, not bring her intellectual and artistic energies into the physical 
creation of the material world in which she lives? Can she not produce objects that are 
both a necessity and an expression of her creative human powers? If so, then why would 
this production hold any less value than the development of human powers as “an end in 
itself”?  While Bellamy’s distinction between mental and intellectual labor runs counter 
to Marx’s fundamental understanding of human productive activity, the latter’s insistence 
that necessary production is to be valued only for its efficiency forms the basis for 
Bellamy’s belief that the individual need not express her full range of human capacities in 
the performance of her work.  
 In many ways, Bellamy’s utopia actively combats the presence of alienated labor 
produced by the capitalist system of production. The early Marx defined alienated labor 
as that which separates man from the products of his labor, from other human beings, and 
from his own “vital activity” (Manuscripts 328-9). In Bellamy’s society, the worker is no 
longer divorced from the products of his labor; the elimination of class means that those 
who produce the goods are no longer barred from their consumption. Furthermore, the 




workings connects the processes of production and consumption, thus uniting labor with 
its product on a social scale. Bellamy’s utopia also eliminates the estrangement of the 
worker from his fellows by creating a society built on solidarity and cooperation and 
establishing the worker’s production as social activity. However, the way in which he 
defines “vital activity” undermines the potential of his utopia to fully eradicate alienated 
labor. Bellamy’s utopia sets up a society in which all labor has the potential to be a self-
fulfilling activity for the worker. Labor is not forced, but voluntary, and every worker is 
educated in such a way as to choose employment for which he is well-suited and from 
which he can derive enjoyment. Further, there is no indication that manual labor in 
Bellamy’s utopia must be divorced from mental activity. The goods in Bellamy’s utopia 
are associated not just with utility, but with beauty; West’s description of the “broad 
streets, shaded by trees and lined with fine buildings” in between which “statues glistened 
and fountains flashed” marks a blending of utility and aesthetics that carries over into the 
“bewildering variety” of fabrics that he finds at the massive and elegant shopping center 
(22, 60). Bellamy’s material world suggests not utility and uniformity, but beauty and 
variety; thus, the active creation of it, the labor performed in its production, need not be 
wholly divorced from an aesthetically-motivated craftsmanship or a variety of activity. 
Furthermore, while the worker in Bellamy’s utopia usually remains in the same trade for 
his entire career, there is no indication that he is subject to a monotonous repetition of 
activity; in fact, Leete tells us that advancement of position is common in the industrial 
army and that this advancement is facilitated by knowledge of one’s trade and skill in its 
execution (75). There are therefore significant indications that manual labor in Bellamy’s 




material realm from the “higher activities” that “alone mean life,” in denying this labor 
the status of “vital activity,” Bellamy suggests that the worker is ultimately alienated 
from his labor. His labor is not considered, in the words of the early Marx, part of his 
“essential being” (Manuscripts 326). It is thus the insistence on the separation between 
the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom, shared by both Bellamy and the late 
Marx, that allows for the continued presence of alienated labor. In classifying “vital 
activity” as only that which occurs outside the realm of material production, both thinkers 
put forth a societal vision in which much of the work performed is philosophically 
proscribed from contributing to the “full and free development” of the individual. In the 
next chapter, I will examine the way in which Morris and the early Marx, in eschewing 
the distinction between necessary human production and free human production, move 
beyond this limited definition of “vital activity” and thus move beyond alienated labor in 














CHAPTER TWO: LABOR AS LIFE-ACTIVITY IN NEWS FROM NOWHERE 
While Bellamy shied away from an association with socialism, Morris left no 
doubt that he was a passionate socialist. He publicly announced his conversion to 
socialism in 1883 and remained active in various socialist organizations for much of his 
life.  Morris also directly acknowledged his debt to Marx; in his “The Hopes of 
Civilization,” Morris credits Marx for making “modern Socialism what it is” through his 
historical analysis of class struggle and his conception of the inevitable evolution that 
would bring Socialism into being (323). In “How I Became a Socialist,” Morris explains 
that he turned to Marx for a better understanding of the “economical side of Socialism” 
(380). Morris’s relationship to Marx was established primarily though his reading of 
Capital Volume One; adopting the Althusserian conception of the epistemological break, 
scholars such as Rob Breton and Ruth Kinna have noted that Morris only had access to 
the “scientific” Marx and thus consider his contributions to Morris’s thought as being 
primarily structural, as opposed to ethical (47, 500). Judging by his own account, this 
seems to be the way in which Morris read Marx: as an historian and economist, not a 
philosopher. As Stanley Pierson explains in his insightful history of British Socialism, the 
Marx to whom Morris had access “left little room for the questions which engaged 
Morris most deeply;” thus, Morris, like other “Ethical Socialists” of his time, “inserted 
his own ideas and values into the Marxist framework” (80).  
While Morris’s historical relationship to Marx has often been discussed, what has 
not been thoroughly examined is the way in which Morris, in seeking an ethic to 
supplement the “scientific” socialism of the later Marx, comes to adopt a philosophy that 




Manuscripts and The German Ideology, which were not published until years after 
Morris’s death. Furthermore, as I have argued in my introduction, the conception of the 
Althusserian break, which postulates that the later Marx abandoned his early 
philosophical humanism, is problematic. Instead, I have read Marx as remaining faithful 
to his notion of a human essence that should be allowed to flourish in every individual 
and have argued that the significant shift in Marx regards his understanding of the role of 
labor in this process of human emancipation: while the early Marx presents all 
unalienated labor as a fundamental component of human development, the later Marx 
severs the realization of the human essence from necessary material production. In this 
chapter, I will seek to establish that Morris’s philosophy of labor, as expressed in News 
from Nowhere, aligns with that of the early Marx and will thus argue that through this 
alignment Morris necessarily (while perhaps not consciously) does not simply fill a void 
left by the “scientific” Marx, but places himself in opposition to the philosophy of labor 
that underlies Marx’s later works. Peter Smith has recently acknowledged, in an 
important move away from a strictly historical understanding of the relationship between 
Morris and Marx, that Morris “reinstated some of the key principles in the early writing 
of Marx” (139); however, he also assumes that the “ontological significance of labor” 
recognized by Morris and the early Marx remains unchanged for the Marx of Capital and 
thus aligns Morris with a monolithic vision of Marx’s philosophy of labor (131). In 
reading Morris’s utopia as an expression of the early labor philosophy of Marx, I will 
highlight the important distinction between the early and late Marx overlooked by Smith 
and will show that Morris’s separation from the labor philosophy of both the later Marx 




labor: In refusing to acknowledge a distinction between the “realm of necessity” and the 
“realm of freedom,” Morris presents a society in which all labor can be understood as 
connected to the human essence. Furthermore, I will argue that while Morris, unlike 
Bellamy, echoes Marx’s vision of the way in which socialism would be achieved through 
political revolution, he comes into conflict with the Marx of Capital in his hesitancy to 
employ the collective productive forces of capitalism as the economic foundation for his 
socialist utopia. In doing so, Morris further removes himself from the vision of the 
socialist future presented by both the later Marx and Bellamy. In the case of Bellamy, I 
have argued that it is his limited view of the role of labor that compromises his utopia; in 
this chapter, I will argue that, for Morris, it is his desire to completely break with the 
economic foundations of capitalism that imposes limitations on his utopian vision. 
As with Looking Backward, the reader sees Morris’s imagined future through the 
eyes of a visitor from the nineteenth century. William “Guest” (as he gives his surname to 
the inhabitants of Nowhere) is a socialist who falls asleep in nineteenth-century London 
and mysteriously awakes in the year 2102 to find that the city in which he fell asleep has 
been radically transformed: In place of “smoke-vomiting chimneys” and the clamor of 
“riveting and hammering,” he finds a sparkling, unpolluted Thames lined with “quaint 
and fanciful little buildings” (48). As with Bellamy’s West, Guest is helped to understand 
his new surroundings by friendly inhabitants of the new society. Guest quickly comes to 
understand, through both his own observations and the explanations of his new 
companions, that the world in which he finds himself is one in which humanity’s 
relationship to labor has been fundamentally changed. Instead of being a necessary 




through Nowhere is the process of learning how labor came to be viewed in such a way; 
as Daniel Shea has cleverly noted, Morris creates “a quest tale whose goal is unalienated 
labor itself” (158). One of the first things Guest discovers is that labor in Nowhere is not 
performed for monetary gain; his first encounter with an inhabitant of Nowhere is the 
young and handsome Dick, who is working as a boatman on the Thames. After having 
“employed” Dick to take him out into the water for a swim, he attempts to pay him for 
his services. Dick is confused by the offered coins and explains that he would feel strange 
about taking a “gift” from Guest in exchange for his services because “giving people 
casts about the water is my business, which I would do for anybody; so to take gifts in 
connection with it would look very queer” (50). The absence of monetary exchange in 
Nowhere is confirmed for Guest when he is taken by Dick, who becomes his guide, to a 
market, where he discovers that the young girl running the shop is equally as confused 
about the subject of payment (74). So, neither services rendered nor materially productive 
labor is tied to the laborer’s subsistence: there is no system of exchange to purchase the 
worker’s time or product. Guest also discovers that inhabitants of Nowhere are engaged 
in a variety of employments. When he asks if Dick will be able to quit his employment as 
a boatman to act as his guide, Dick informs him that he has a friend who would be very 
pleased to take over the task while he is away: “He is a weaver from Yorkshire, who has 
rather overdone himself between his weaving and his mathematics, both indoor work, 
you see; and being a great friend of mine, he naturally came to me to get him some 
outdoor work” (51). Dick’s friend, though already engaged in both a materially 
productive activity and an intellectual one, is still in search of further variety that will 




directed; in Nowhere, one may move fluidly from one employment to another as one 
feels inclined to do so. It thus becomes clear that labor in Nowhere is not only freed from 
any ties to the worker’s subsistence but is also freed from the external pressure of a 
societal system that structures employment. Guest soon learns that, in the absence of 
external pressures, the only motivating force behind the individual’s decision to work is 
his desire to do so. While Dick acknowledges that, in the past, there was a “disease called 
Idleness,” he says that now the idea that someone might not like to work is “too 
ridiculous” (75-6). Dick refers to employments such as “house-building, and street-
paving, and gardening” as “genuinely amusing work” (68). This is confirmed when he 
and Guest come upon a group of workers mending a road, and Guest notes that after 
moving out of the travelers’ way, they return eagerly to their employment “like men with 
a pleasant task at hand;” Dick explains that group tasks like this are considered “good 
sport” and carry with them a great amount of merriment because “everything seems like a 
joke when we have a pleasant spell of work on” (83).  
Guest’s journey leads him to the home of Dick’s great-grandfather, Hammond, 
who is to act as Guest’s primary source of direct information about the transformed role 
of labor in Morris’s utopia; as Leete acts as the voice of Bellamy, guiding the reader 
through the underlying ideals of his utopia, so Hammond acts as the voice of Morris. 
Claiming to be traveler from a far-off place, Guest explains to Hammond that he should 
speak to him of their society as though he were “a being from another planet” (89). 
Furthermore, as someone interested in history who possesses a much greater knowledge 
of the past than Dick, Hammond is able to act as a bridge between Guest’s time and his 




work when there is no reward of labour, and especially how you get them to work 
strenuously?” (122). Hammond’s reply reveals the philosophy of labor around which 
Morris’s entire utopian vision is structured; he tells Guest that “the reward of labour is 
life,” and that the payment for “especially good work” is “the reward of creation” (122). 
He goes on to say that being paid for “the pleasure of creation, which is what excellence 
in work means” would be akin to having “a bill sent in for the begetting of children” 
(122). In response to Guest’s rebuttal that people have a “natural desire” to procreate but 
no such innate desire to work, Hammond asserts that this is “wholly untrue” (122); their 
society, he explains, is built on the premise that “happiness without happy daily work is 
impossible” (123). In Morris’s imagined future, labor is understood to be a fundamental 
element of human existence; it is as “natural” to the species as procreation. Like 
procreation, it is necessary for the continuation of species-life, it is the means through 
which existence itself is created. Labor, however, is not just a necessity; it is the way in 
which the individual expresses her innate human desire to create. Because of this natural 
desire to create, labor is a process of making visible the worker’s human essence; she 
thus strives in her work because her product is an extension of herself. Without the means 
to express her human desire to create, the individual would be incomplete; thus, there is 
no happiness without daily productive activity. In removing external pressures to labor, 
Morris’s imagined society has simply allowed human nature to flourish by reuniting the 
individual with her innate desire to work.  
It is in this understanding of labor as a fundamental human activity essential to the 
full development of the individual that Morris aligns his utopian vision with the early 




worker is alienated from his labor under the capitalist system because “the labor is 
external to the worker, i.e. it does not belong to his essential being; […] he therefore does 
not confirm himself in his work, but denies himself, feels miserable and not happy, does 
not develop free mental and physical energy, but mortifies his flesh and ruins his mind” 
(326, my emphasis). As Marx makes clear, it is only through a reunification with his own 
production that the worker fully realizes his “essential being.” For Marx, the human 
essence is not an abstract conception but is shaped by the active interaction of the 
individual with the material world: “The whole character of a species, its species-
character, resides in the nature of its life activity, and free conscious activity constitutes 
the species-character of man” (328). This “life activity,” for Marx, takes the form of 
production and labor; as he explains, “The practical creation of an objective world, the 
fashioning of inorganic nature, is proof that man is a conscious species-being […] It is 
therefore in his fashioning of the objective that man really proves himself to be a species-
being. Such production is his active species-life” (329). Thus, for both Morris and Marx, 
the individual, in order to realize her humanity, must engage in productive activity; she 
must participate in the “fashioning of the objective” to realize her essence as a creative 
being. As Marx argues, while the worker engages in such production in the capitalist 
system, his own life-activity appears as alien to him because he is compelled to work by 
another, thus “he feels that he is acting freely only in his animal functions—eating, 
drinking and procreating;” therefore, his labor constitutes not “the satisfaction of need but 
a mere means to satisfy needs outside itself” (326-7). In other words, what should 
constitute his life, his productive activity, becomes merely something he does in order 




is separated from his essentially human activity, it is only “animal” life. It is for this 
reason that Marx, in The German Ideology, stresses that material labor must not be 
viewed as merely a means to an end; he argues that because human beings “begin to 
distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of 
subsistence,” this “mode of production must not be considered simply as being the 
reproduction of the physical existence of individuals. Rather it is a definite form of 
expressing their life, a definite mode of life on their part” (37). Production, the foundation 
of human “life-activity,” is inextricably tied to the meeting of material needs; therefore, 
there can be no separation between the creation of the material world and the expression 
of the human essence. This is the meaning of Hammond’s assertion that “the reward of 
labour is life;” it is the recognition that labor creates life in the sense that it produces the 
material conditions of existence while simultaneously embodying human life-activity. 
Because of this recognition that labor is life-activity, not merely a means to an end, daily 
work in Morris’s utopia, the meeting of everyday needs, becomes a source of pleasure 
which carries with it the “reward of creation.” The fact that labor has become a central 
pleasure of life signifies that the worker has been reunited with his “essential being” and 
is no longer alienated from his labor: the worker now “confirms himself in his work,” no 
longer “denies himself” or “feels miserable and not happy,” but is free to fully develop 
his “mental and physical energy.”  
Thus for Morris, as for the early Marx, the individual does not fully develop as a 
human being until she can freely express her creative essence through the production of 
her material existence; the meeting of material necessities is not an obstacle to be 




the understanding of labor shared by Morris and the early Marx diverges from that shared 
by Bellamy and the later Marx. As I have discussed in the previous chapter, the latter 
present a vision of a socialist society in which labor performed in the “realm of 
necessity” is divorced from activities performed in the “realm of freedom” which 
constitute the individual’s essential human activity. In Bellamy’s utopia, this creates a 
situation in which much of the labor performed in his imagined society is precluded from 
contributing to the development of the individual as a creative species-being; while his 
citizens voluntarily engage in material production, and this daily activity is made as 
pleasurable as possible by matching individuals with the job for which they are best 
suited, material production is still considered fundamentally as a duty to be performed, as 
a means rather than an end-in-itself. In contrast, in Morris’s utopia, all labor is celebrated 
as essential human activity which contributes to the happiness of the individual. This 
philosophical difference does not remain in the realm of the abstract but forms the 
respective underlying structures of the two utopias; a thorough examination of the way in 
which Morris imagines labor to be carried out in his utopia and the way in which his 
vision differs from Bellamy’s will highlight the practical differences in application of the 
two philosophies.  
Morris’s reimagining of labor in News from Nowhere has often been considered 
as advocating a return to the principles of medieval handicraft. As Smith argues, Morris 
embraced a “nostalgic aestheticism” which “saw in the craftworkers of the Middle Ages a 
level of imaginative agency quite lacking in the modern artisan” (146). Likewise, for 
Kinna, Morris seeks “to reestablish work on the basis of a craft-specialism” that is 




Morris’s utopia that highlights his attention to craftwork; his vision of a socialist future 
clearly prizes skilled handicraft over the industrialized production of the capitalist 
present. From Guest’s first vision of the sparkling Thames, it is clear that the factories 
which once lined its waters have been eliminated. As Hammond explains to Guest, a 
return to handicraft after the revolution that brought about the new order (which I will 
discuss in more detail later) constituted a blending of art and utility that contributed 
significantly to the new vision of labor as fundamental life-activity. According to 
Hammond, once the worker was freed from the imperative to produce “slave-wares for 
the poor and mere wealth-wasting wares for the rich,” he began to put that saved time and 
energy into the production of goods that were both useful and beautiful, the production 
“of what used to be called art, but which has no name amongst us now, because it has 
become a necessary part of the labour of every man who produces” (160). No longer 
forced to overwork by the demands of capitalist production, workers were allowed the 
freedom to “do the best they could with the work at hand—to make it excellent of its 
kind” and this manifested itself as the infusion of beauty into all goods produced (160). 
This attention to aesthetics resulted in a decided move away from mechanized production 
because it came to be understood that “machines could not produce works of art” (201); 
thus, industrial production in Nowhere was largely supplanted by pre-capitalist 
handicraft. To return to Hammond’s earlier statement, this blending of material 
production with artistic expression in the labor of the skilled artisan carries with it the 
“reward of creation” which makes it a pleasurable activity. This blending of art and 
utility in the production of goods is one of the primary ways in which Morris’s utopia 




everyday production of useful objects becomes an opportunity for the individual to 
express her creative human essence. As Guest learns when he stops at a shop to acquire a 
tobacco pipe, goods in Nowhere are clearly marked by artistic production; the pipe given 
to him by the shop girl is “pretty and gay,” “carved out of some hard wood very 
elaborately, and mounted in gold sprinkled with little gems”; Guest protests that it is “too 
grand for me, or for anybody but the Emperor of the World” (73). When Guest suggests 
to Dick that the pipe may be “too valuable for its use,” the latter does not understand him 
(81); in Nowhere, aesthetically-motivated production is the norm, so the idea of any 
useful object being “too grand” for its use (or its user) is a foreign concept. 
While much attention has been given to the role of handicraft in Morris’s utopia, 
and this blending of art and utility is one of the primary ways in which the worker of 
Nowhere is united with her creative human essence, it is not only in the skilled 
production of beautiful goods that the worker finds individual fulfillment in labor. As was 
seen with the workers Guest encounters on the road, necessary physical labor whose end 
goal is not an aesthetic object is also considered a pleasurable and fulfilling task. Guest’s 
journey with Dick, while an opportunity for the stranger to learn of the society in which 
he finds himself, also has a tangible end-goal: Dick is taking Guest upriver to a hay-
harvesting in which he has promised to participate. Hay-harvesting in Nowhere is 
considered a “festival,” a great social event that brings with it much merriment. Guest 
learns that the prospect of doing such “easy-hard work” is appealing to the inhabitants of 
Nowhere; as Dick explains, “easy-hard work” is the type of labor that “tries the muscles 
and hardens them and sends you pleasantly weary to bed, but which isn’t trying in other 




road mending, the hay-harvest is appreciated as a pleasant form of exercise; the very act 
of physical exertion in the service of a socially useful task is itself prized. In the words of 
Hammond, this form of work is a source of “sensuous pleasure” (123). It is not devalued 
because it does not require mental exertion or a finely-tuned skill, but is appreciated as 
one form of meaningful labor in a society in which inhabitants are encouraged to engage 
in multiple productive activities: it is one facet of the full development of the individual. 
Unlike physical exercise for the purpose of leisure, the physical exertion of the 
inhabitants of Nowhere is itself a productive activity; the act is a sensuous pleasure, but it 
is also a necessary one that results, to return to the words of Marx, in “the fashioning of 
the objective.”  
It must also be noted that while the labor of many of the hay-harvesters is 
considered “easy-hard work,” a pleasure primarily for its physical exertion, the finer 
points of agriculture are themselves considered the work of the artisan. As an old man 
present at the harvest explains to Guest, at the time of the revolution, “everything in and 
about the fields was done by elaborate machines used quite unintelligently by the 
laborers,” but as the people began to realize the pleasure of labor, they began to want to 
take intelligent control of the process once again; thus, they began to “pick up the 
agricultural arts by carefully watching the way in which the machines worked” and the 
older workers “managed to teach the younger ones gradually a little artisanship” (199, 
my emphasis). An active turning away from agricultural machinery ensued, and the skill 
and knowledge that had once been a necessary part of such tasks were regained. While I 
will discuss Morris’s attitude towards machinery later in the chapter, I wish now to 




production of beautiful objects. The abandonment of machines because they could not 
produce art means not just that they were viewed as incapable of producing properly 
aesthetic objects, but that they were seen as impeding the artistry inherent in the skilled 
execution of all forms of labor. In Nowhere, one need not be producing an object of 
beauty to be engaged in artistic production; even the production of food, perhaps the most 
basic necessity, is considered not as mundane necessary labor but as the creative 
execution of the “agricultural arts.”  
Many of the readers of News from Nowhere have focused on the way in which 
labor is made fulfilling in Morris’s utopia through its embodiment of artistry and 
sensuous pleasure. As Smith rightly notes, Morris reinvents the human relationship to 
labor through his blending of artistic and necessary production, which results in a 
breaking down of “the false dichotomies of the practical and the aesthetic, the utilitarian 
and the poetic” (136); and, as Beaumont notes, Morris’s focus on the pleasure of 
everyday tasks “effectively deconstructs the difference between work and play” (48). As 
both scholars note, the organization of labor in Nowhere is notable for its ability to break 
down divisions; these acts of deconstruction, the collapsing of the dichotomies utility/art 
and work/play, are important components of what I am arguing is Morris’s larger project: 
the blending of necessary and free production. Necessary labor, in Morris’s utopia, is 
capable of carrying with it both the enjoyment of artistic expression and the pleasure of 
play; thus, it is not merely the performance of a duty, but a free exercise of the human 
powers that contributes to the full development of the individual. It is easy to see how, in 
Marx’s terms, material production becomes united with the “life-activity” of the worker. 




artistic expression or its sensual enjoyment. As Hammond tells Guest, “all work is now 
pleasurable,” and while this is primarily because most work is done by “artists” and there 
is “conscious sensuous pleasure” in the work itself, this is not the only way in which 
work becomes free activity for the inhabitants of Nowhere: labor can also be made 
pleasurable by “the hope of gain in honour and wealth with which the work is done, 
which causes pleasurable excitement, even when the actual work is not pleasant” or 
“because it has grown into a pleasurable habit, as in the case with what you may call 
mechanical work” (122-3). Critics have often overlooked these two forms of labor in 
Morris’s utopia, and they warrant further examination; it is, in part, through this more 
comprehensive understanding of labor as presented by Hammond that Morris moves 
beyond, to return to the words of Smith, a mere “nostalgic aestheticism.”  
To consider firstly Hammond’s claim that labor is made pleasurable through the 
“hope of gain in honour and wealth,” it must be realized that “wealth” in Morris’s utopia 
can mean nothing other than a contribution to the social accumulation of useful products. 
Dick’s inability to understand Guest’s suggestion that the ornate tobacco pipe might be 
“too valuable for its use” points to the fact that there is no value in Morris’s utopia other 
than the direct utility of the object. As I have discussed in the previous chapter, Bellamy 
employs exchange-value for the purpose of regulating production, but in Nowhere, 
exchange-value has been wholly eradicated. Thus, an accumulation of goods cannot be 
transformed into monetary wealth. Furthermore, as Guest notes, the “sacred rights of 
property” are no longer a structuring element of society in Nowhere (91); as Hammond 
explains further, private property laws were abolished along with class: once everyone 




became “easy for us to live without robbing each other” (112). The attitude towards 
private property in Nowhere is perhaps best expressed by the shop girl who sells Guest 
his pipe: when Guest expresses his fear of losing such a fine object, she replies simply, 
“What will it matter if you do? Somebody is sure to find it, and he will use it, and you 
can get another” (74). Because goods are only appreciated for their immediate utility, 
once that a pipe loses its utility for Guest (i.e. he loses it), it will simply assume a utility 
for someone else. Thus, wealth in Morris’s utopia, as in Bellamy’s, means the production 
of useful objects which are considered more collective than private in nature. Because 
there is no value outside of the properties of the object itself, the individual accumulation 
of goods would become, in the words of Bellamy’s Leete, “merely burdensome the 
moment they exceed what adds to real comfort” (69). The pleasure derived from the 
production of wealth in Morris’s utopia must thus be understood in terms of Hammond’s 
assertion that “the reward of labour is life;” the production of wealth means the creation 
of the material conditions of existence, the creation of all things, as Morris says 
elsewhere, that “serve the pleasure of the people” (“Useful Work” 291).  
What, then, of the gain of honor through labor to which Hammond refers? This, 
too, is intrinsically tied to utility, to both the production of useful objects and the 
performance of useful services: work done, in other words, in the service of a collective 
good. As Beaumont correctly notes, in Nowhere, “all work is useful” (43). What needs to 
be understood is the way in which this attention to usefulness is, for Morris, largely 
lacking in the capitalist society against which he poses his alternative vision of life and 
how the centrality of usefulness is an important part of the way in which work is reunited 




Toil,” Morris argues that much of the work performed under the capitalist system is 
devoid of usefulness because it is performed by those who are not concerned with the 
“production of utilities” but instead “spend their lives and energies in fighting amongst 
themselves for the respective shares of the wealth” which others produce (290). In other 
words, while these individuals perform what is considered work in a capitalist society, 
the goal of their activity is not production itself. Morris here speaks primarily of those 
who are involved in manufacturing and commercial endeavors, those who own the means 
of production and those who are responsible for the distribution of the goods produced. 
Here we see a parallel to Marx, who establishes in Capital Volume One that those who 
control the means of production are concerned with the production of use-values only in 
as much as they lead to an increase in their personal store of capital: “Use-values are 
produced by capitalists only because and in so far as they form the material sub-stratum 
of exchange-value, are the bearers of exchange-value” (293). The goal of the commercial 
worker, as Marx establishes in Volume Three, is to aid the industrial capitalist in the 
process of valorization, to help him in his exploitation of the surplus-value produced by 
the workers (407). In addition to the members of the capitalist economy who directly 
benefit from the exploitation of productive labor for profit, Morris also speaks of the 
wage-workers who are “engaged in the service of the private war for wealth,” the clerks 
and assistants and those engaged in “competitive salesmanship,” otherwise known as “the 
puffery of wares” (291). For Morris, these are all jobs which qualify as “useless toil” 
because they do not contribute to the real wealth of society, which includes for Morris not 
just tangible objects, but also the “storing up of knowledge of all kinds, and the power of 




employed usefully, but one must contribute to the betterment of society. Because 
capitalist production is concerned primarily with the creation of profit, it relegates a large 
portion of workers to the meeting of this goal and thus deprives them of engagement in 
truly productive labor. Again this parallels Marx, who notes that the capitalist mode of 
production creates “a vast number of functions at present indispensable, but in themselves 
superfluous” (CV.1 667, my emphasis). The elimination of these employments which are 
“superfluous” once the “production of utilities” becomes the only goal of labor is one of 
the primary focuses of Morris’s utopian vision.  
For Morris, the usefulness of labor, its ability to contribute to the real wealth of 
society, is central to the elimination of alienated labor; as he goes on to say in “Useful 
Work,” “The first step towards making labour attractive is to get the means of making 
labour fruitful, the Capital, including the land, machinery, factories, etc., into the hands of 
the community, to be used for the good of all alike, so that we might all work at 
‘supplying’ the real ‘demands’ of each and all—that it to say, work for livelihood, instead 
of working to supply the demand of the profit market” (298). To return once again to 
Hammond’s claim, the “reward of labour is life,” so for labor to carry with it this reward, 
it must contribute to the real conditions of existence, not the abstract realm of monetary 
gain. How, then, does this meeting of the “real demands” of society translate, for Morris, 
into the “hope of honour”? As he explains in “Useful Work,” labor in the service of 
meeting social needs carries with it “the consciousness of benefiting ourselves and our 
neighbors,” which can be “counted on in sweetening tasks otherwise irksome, since 
social morality, the responsibility of man towards the life of man, will, in the new order 




abstract idea” (299). In Morris’s utopia, his representation of the “new order of things,” 
necessary labor carries with it the satisfaction derived from a humanist desire to improve 
the conditions of social life. This desire transforms the act of labor: it is not simply that 
the work is performed as a necessary duty that, despite its desirable outcome, remains a 
burden, but that the very sense of the work’s importance makes the act of labor itself a 
pleasurable activity. Morris goes on to make the connection between utility and honor 
clear, noting that “rougher work” otherwise burdensome can be made attractive to the 
worker “by the sense of special or peculiar usefulness (and therefore honour) in the mind 
of the man who performs it freely” (305, my emphasis). In Morris’s conception of labor, 
utility is equated with honor, and this sense of honor, which imbues necessary tasks with 
meaning, creates a connection between the worker as humanist and the labor he performs 
in the service of humanity.  
As I noted in the previous chapter, this sense of honor also underlies necessary 
labor in Bellamy’s utopia. Because Bellamy’s workers understand their labor as social 
activity and themselves as social beings, intrinsically connected to the social whole, they 
are driven by a “passion for humanity” that “animates” them with “the ardor of self-
devotion” (56-7). However, as I argued, the potential for socially necessary work to 
promote individual fulfillment is compromised by Bellamy’s insistence on a separation 
between material production performed in the realm of necessity and individual growth 
carried out in the realm of freedom. Morris, in his equally unequivocal insistence that no 
such divide exists, realizes the potential inherent in Bellamy’s understanding of the 
worker as social being. In Bellamy’s conception, while the sense of honor derived from 




attractiveness, to the act of labor, he still understands this labor to be separated from the 
free development of the individual. Because Morris realizes individual fulfillment as 
intrinsically tied to necessary production, the satisfaction derived from the meeting of 
social needs becomes just another way, in addition to artistic expression and sensuous 
pleasure, that the individual expresses her human essence through labor.  
As I have shown, Morris’s utopia showcases an active turning away from 
mechanized production; after the “Great Change,” “machine after machine was quietly 
dropped under the excuse that the machines could not produce works of art, and that 
works of art were more and more called for” (201). As I have also discussed, this turning 
away from mechanized production in favor of skilled handicraft extends to every type of 
production, even that of the most basic necessities, such as food. However, machines 
have not been altogether eliminated in Nowhere; furthermore, as Hammond suggests, 
“mechanical work” can still hold pleasure for the laborer “because it has grown into a 
pleasurable habit” (122). In a recent article, R. Jayne Hildebrand has convincingly argued 
that News from Nowhere positions habit as “a behavioural substrate for the support of 
creativity and adaptability” (16). For Hildebrand, Morris combats the nineteenth (and 
arguably twenty-first) century notion that habit is oppositional to “aesthetic 
consciousness” (11). She notes that, in Nowhere, it is only after the worker has achieved 
“deftness” in his task that he can begin to express his artistry: “[T]he habituated dexterity 
of Nowhere’s labourers support their aptitude for infinitely complex and varied kinds of 
labour, much in the same way a jazz musician’s habitual familiarity with jazz scales 
enables unthinkably complex and beautiful improvisations upon them” (17). As opposed 




exploited for the “maximization of production,” the habitually-formed skill of the worker 
in Nowhere “unleashes the expression of aesthetic exuberance in the work process” (17).  
While Hildebrand’s reading does much towards understanding the role of habit as 
it lends itself to the type of artistic handicraft with which Morris is so often associated, it 
must also be understood that not all habitual work in Nowhere leads to a more complex 
form of aesthetic production. When Hammond speaks of the pleasure to be derived from 
“mechanical work,” he does not speak of habitual action as the foundation of a 
pleasurable activity but of the habitual act as a source of pleasure in itself.  It should be 
noted that what Hammond means by “mechanical work” does not necessarily imply 
actual mechanization; it could refer to work that is merely mechanical in nature, i.e. work 
that is done by hand but with repeated, precise actions, any work, in other words, that 
lends itself well to habitual motion. However, Morris makes clear that the role of 
mechanization in his utopia is the carrying out of tasks that do not lend themselves to the 
particular joys of handicraft: “All the work which would be irksome to do by hand is 
done by vastly-improved machinery; and in all work which it is a pleasure to do by hand 
machinery is done without” (127). Given that handicraft derives its importance from its 
ability to allow for artistic variation (even in the case of the “agricultural arts,” which 
must respond constantly to varying conditions) and the use of specialized skill, this 
passage suggests that the work which is not a pleasure to be done by hand is that which 
does not allow for artistic variation or require a finely-honed skill. Even in Nowhere, in 
which the dichotomy of art/utility has been deconstructed, there are clearly still objects 
whose production does not allow for such variance and intellectual engagement. Thus it 




looking novels of the nineteenth century” (Beaumont 35), machinery finds a place: in 
keeping with the spirit of Morris’s vision, its employment is part of the making-
pleasurable of labor that would otherwise be tedious. Ruth Kinna has recently argued that 
in Morris’s future, “the productive capacity of machinery would be released in order to 
reduce the amount of necessary labor time” (502); mechanized production is, for Morris, 
“not suitable for voluntary labor” but could be used to “relieve the burden of necessary 
work” (508). However, as I hope I have shown, Morris’s utopia is not concerned with the 
reduction of necessary labor time; in fact, there is a fear amongst the inhabitants of 
Nowhere that there will not be enough useful work for everyone in the future (122). 
Furthermore, there is no such thing as labor that is not voluntary in Nowhere: all labor is 
undertaken for the purpose of individual fulfillment as well as the meeting of societal 
needs. Machinery can therefore not be said to reduce the amount of necessary labor in 
Nowhere; instead, it is responsible for the transformation of otherwise tedious work into a 
“pleasurable habit.” In other words, it is another way in which labor in Morris’s utopia is 
removed from the realm of alienation: to return to the words of Marx, labor that might 
otherwise have caused the individual to deny himself in his work, to feel “miserable and 
not happy,” becomes another means to express his “active species-life.”  
As I have noted in the previous chapter, the “full and free development” of the 
individual, which would, for Marx, form the “ruling principle” of any “higher form of 
society” is predicated on the turning of the worker from a “one-sided implement” of 
capitalist production into a being that is capable of exercising a variety of human powers 
(CV. 1 739,458). Bellamy seeks to accomplish this through his attention to the full 




the citizens of Bellamy’s utopia have both the knowledge and the “free time” to engage 
in a variety of employments that allow for the exercise of their intellectual and artistic 
faculties. Furthermore, within the realm of material production itself, Bellamy has 
allowed for the individual to become fully-developed within his trade; no worker is left 
unskilled. However, as I have shown, because of his separation between socially 
necessary labor and the truly free activity of the individual, Bellamy has undervalued the 
realm of material production and, as such, much of the labor performed in his utopia is 
seen primarily as a means to an end: it is seen “not as the satisfaction of a need but as a 
mere means to satisfy needs outside itself” (Manuscripts 326). While, as I have argued, 
the Marx of Capital did not intend for the “realm of necessity” to include all material 
production, the practical outcome of an attempt to define such a realm leads to the 
conditions of Bellamy’s utopia, in which the “full and free development” of the 
individual is divorced from her daily labor. In Morris’s utopia, on the other hand, in 
which there is no distinction between the realm of freedom and the realm of necessity, 
every act of labor contributes to the development of the individual as a creative species-
being. There is no separation between the means and the ends of labor: the fulfillment of 
societal needs acts simultaneously as the means by which the individual fully realizes the 
vast array of her human powers. Guest summarizes the role of labor in Nowhere 
eloquently: “I looked, and wondered indeed, at the deftness and abundance of beauty of 
the work of men who had at last learned to accept life itself as a pleasure, and the 
satisfaction of the common needs of mankind and the preparation for them, as work fit 
for the best of the race” (201). Morris’s equation of “life itself” with the “satisfaction of 




Morris’s utopia: his utopia accomplishes what Marx terms in The German Ideology “the 
transformation of labour into self-activity” (97). In Nowhere, the creation of the material 
conditions of life and life itself are one in the same.  
The parallel between News from Nowhere and The German Ideology also holds 
the key to understanding how the practical application of Marx’s early philosophy of 
labor is carried out in the organization of work in Morris’s utopia. In the German 
Ideology, we get what Eagleton has called one of Marx’s “few frankly utopian 
speculations” (24):  
[A]s soon as the division of labour comes into being, each man has a 
particular, exclusive sphere of activity, which is forced upon him and from 
which he cannot escape. He is a hunter, a fisherman, a shepherd, or a 
critical critic, and must remain so if he does not want to lose his means of 
livelihood; whereas in a communist society, where nobody has one 
exclusive sphere of activity, but each can become accomplished in any 
branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and thus makes 
it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in 
the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after 
dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, 
shepherd or critic. (53) 
This image of life beyond capitalist production has often been derided for its utopian 
quality, for the impossibility of its actualization, and it has been suggested that even Marx 
himself did not take this vision seriously. In addition to claiming that the eradication of 




expresses his belief that this view is not “plausibly attributable” to Marx, especially “if 
one takes into account his later writings” (238). While Llorente does not go on to explain 
why Marx would include this vision in his writings were it one he did not support, 
Beilharz suggests that this “playful image” was merely Marx’s attempt at a “paraphrase 
of” or “pun upon” Fourier’s utopian vision (598-9). I wish to argue, however, that this 
image is not merely a playful one (though one cannot deny the humorous tone in phrases 
like “critical critic”) but is a practical extension of the philosophy of labor present in 
Marx’s early works. In a society in which labor is not separated from self- activity, in 
which “necessary” work time in the social realm is not divided from “free” time in the 
individual realm, the life of the individual is expressed through her socialized production. 
Thus, “the development of individuals into complete individuals” becomes equivalent 
with engagement in various productive employments (GI 97). When labor is a 
fundamental aspect of life, the fullness of one’s life depends upon the variety of one’s 
labors. This understanding structures both the brief vision of labor in a post-capitalist 
society as put forth here by Marx, as well as the extended vision brought into being by 
Morris’s utopia. In Nowhere, every individual actively pursues a variety of productive 
activities which vary along the spectrums of artistic to pragmatic, mental to physical, and 
varied to routine. Morris recognizes that none of these activities, taken alone, would 
result in the full development of the individual. Unlike Bellamy’s utopia, in which the 
individual is expected to realize her full development outside the realm of socially 
necessary labor, the individual in Nowhere embraces the full scope of her human powers 
as she contributes to the needs of society. Thus, the underlying philosophy that it is only 




species-being becomes practically expressed in Morris’s utopia as the need to allow every 
individual to engage in a variety of pursuits, all of which are considered a useful 
contribution to the betterment of society.  
Both Morris’s utopia and the above passage from The German Ideology have 
been understood as largely pastoral; indeed, the glorification of the hay-harvest which 
forms the culmination of Guest’s journey is distinctly Georgian, and the activities Marx 
chooses to highlight in his vision of the communist future are all, with the exception of 
criticism, rural in nature. However, while Morris’s utopian vision, with its active 
rejection of most mechanized production, can be rightly read as largely anti-industrial, 
Marx, even in the early works, cannot be understood as such. It is in their respective 
views on large-scale, mechanized production that Morris and Marx most dramatically 
diverge. While Bellamy is distinguished from Marx for his unwillingness to embrace 
revolutionary political change, Morris was an ardent believer in the necessity of political 
revolution. News from Nowhere contains a brilliantly detailed recounting of the 
protracted class war that gave birth to the “Great Change.” In this way, critics such as 
Raymond Williams are correct in their assertion that socialist visions like Bellamy’s must 
be “radically distinguished from the revolutionary socialism of Morris and Marx” (60). 
However, as I argued in the previous chapter, Marx’s vision of the transition from 
capitalism to socialism is not one of complete rupture: the socialist future must be built 
on the material foundations of capitalism. Morris, in his zealousness to wholly 
reconstruct the role of labor in his future society, abandons these material foundations, 
arguably to the detriment of the viability of his vision. As Hammond tells Guest, the great 




of already produced “wares” and, more significantly, of “the instruments for making 
them” (157). While the previous owners of the means of production, once they saw that 
they were going to lose control, had no incentive to protect them, the “rebels” were 
equally unconcerned; in fact, the latter viewed the existing material structures as one with 
the social relations they were attempting to supplant and thus welcomed their destruction. 
This mindset was embodied in a common saying at the time: “Let the country be cleared 
of everything except valiant living men, rather than we fall into slavery again!” (157). 
Thus, Morris’s utopian future begins with a virtually clean slate, and of the machinery 
that survives the revolution, much of it is actively phased out in the beginnings days of 
the new civilization. One of the first things Guest notices is the absence of factories along 
the Thames, and Dick later explains to him that while there are structures somewhat like 
factories, they are now called “Banded-workshops” and are for the performance of 
“hand-work in which working together is necessary or convenient” (81). While 
Hammond attests to the presence of “immensely improved machinery,” he also makes 
clear that it is only employed when the task is not pleasurable to be performed by hand. 
While some labor may be performed with the aid of machinery, and there are often small 
groups of laborers who band together for the completion of tasks, the vast collective 
“social powers of production” which Marx saw as the fruitful legacy of capitalism are 
noticeably absent (CV. 3 375).  
In fact, Hammond tells Guest that, in Nowhere, “we discourage centralization all 
we can” (101), and Morris’s utopian vision holds true to this maxim. While this 
discouraging of centralization affects many aspects of life in Nowhere, I am particularly 




organization in both production and distribution. When Dick chooses to leave his 
employment as a boatman to accompany Guest as his guide, he simply finds a friend to 
take his place. Laborers in Nowhere seemingly move freely from employment to 
employment; it is self-direction which primarily structures production and the carrying 
out of necessary services. Tasks that require collective labor, such as the hay-harvest, are 
organized through an informal network of neighborly aid: Dick tells Guest that he has 
“promised to go up-stream to some special friends of mine, for the hay-harvest” (51). 
Hammond tells Guest that while there is obviously no “individual exchange,” there are 
“regulations of the markets” carried out by those “whose delight is in administration and 
organization, to use long-tailed words; I mean people who like keeping things together, 
avoiding waste, seeing that nothing sticks fast uselessly” (116). However, as Darko Suvin 
has rightly noted, there is no indication of such organizational structures in Morris’s 
utopia: Morris’s vision embodies “a total refusal to envisage any machinery, 
technological or societal. This amounts to leaving the future society without any 
economic or organizational basis” (81). While I have noted that there is some usage of 
technology in Nowhere, Suvin’s argument is still a valid one: Morris’s commitment to 
radically breaking with industrial capitalism leads him to abandon economic structures all 
together.  
In Marx’s terms, Morris’s utopia marks a return to the pre-capitalist conditions of 
small-scale production and privatized labor. In Capital Volume One, Marx speaks of “a 
new productive power, which is intrinsically a collective one” which arises from 
capitalist production; it is through these collective acts of large-scale production that the 




species” (447). While the worker under the capitalist system cannot recognize the 
potential of this collective power because it is imposed upon him as an outside force, this 
socialized production, when brought under the control of the workers, is the key to the 
creation of society in which the individual can truly develop as a species-being. Small-
scale production, on the other hand, “[a]s it excludes the concentration of these means of 
production, so it also excludes co-operation, […] the social control and regulation of the 
forces of nature, and the free development of the productive forces of society” (927-8). 
For Marx, then, Morris’s return to small-scale production in his post-capitalist future 
would constitute an abandonment of human potential. While Morris’s laborers do work 
together on a small scale in a cooperative manner, and all work contributes to the needs 
(material and otherwise) of society, they are not a socialized productive force in the way 
that Marx imagines; far from being a “comprehensive organization” of “scientifically-
arranged processes of production” (780), the workforce of Nowhere is a loose collection 
of individuals who have no structural means of regulating their productive powers.  
It is undoubtedly Morris’s commitment to the transformation of labor as life-
activity that motivates his desire to move away from centralized production. He critiques 
Looking Backward for what appears to him as a coercive system of labor; he questions 
Bellamy’s assertion that labor is freely undertaken in his “tightly drilled” army (356). For 
Morris, the systematic organization of labor as Bellamy presents it becomes unnecessary 
when “the true incentive to useful and happy labour is […] pleasure in the work itself” 
(357). However, as I have argued in the last chapter, Bellamy’s “industrial army” is not 
established for the purpose of coercion; it is the means by which Bellamy’s society 




needs. The “industrial army” does not represent forced labor, but the organization of 
voluntary labor. In the absence of these organizational structures, labor in Morris’s utopia 
cannot be coordinated beyond the interaction of workers who come into direct contact 
with one another. Morris was also largely unconcerned with efficiency of production; he 
believed that once incentives to produce for the purpose of profit had been removed, once 
production was focused on the meeting of “real demands,” things actually useful to 
society, the meeting of these demands would be easily accomplished. As I have noted, 
the inhabitants of Nowhere are so completely satisfying these demands that they fear they 
will run out of useful work. Just as efficiency need not be a factor in the meeting of 
societal needs, there is also no need, for Morris, to reduce the amount of labor time spent 
in production because of his vision of useful labor as fundamental life-activity. Because 
meeting the material needs of society is not something that must be accomplished before 
life can begin, because labor is not a burden but the primary pleasure of life, the reduction 
of labor time for the betterment of life is an irrelevant concept. Thus, we return to 
Morris’s criticism of Bellamy, that “his only idea for making labour tolerable is to 
decrease the amount of it by means of fresh and ever fresh developments of machinery” 
(357). It is true that, for Bellamy, the productive efficiency of his society is carried out in 
service of the creation of more “free” time for the individual to explore her full 
development outside the realm of material production. This is also the case with the Marx 
of Capital, who sees the social benefit of mechanized large-scale production as a “greater 
reduction in the overall time devoted to material labour” (V.3 958). Because, for Bellamy 




reduction of time spent in service of the latter means more time for the individual to fully 
express herself in the former.  
As I have argued, Morris’s ability to break down the barrier between necessary 
and free production is an essential component of moving beyond the alienation of labor 
as experienced by the worker in the capitalist system. However, his utopia is limited by 
its confidence that self-directed, small-scale production could meet the needs of society. 
While Morris equates productive efficiency with a devaluing of necessary labor, there 
arguably cannot be a modern society that can meet the needs of its citizens without a 
highly-organized, efficient labor force. Is there, then, a way in which a necessary 
efficiency of production can accommodate an understanding of labor as life-activity? Or 
does large-scale socialized production intrinsically entail a division between the realm of 
necessity and the realm of freedom? The final section of this thesis will be dedicated to 















While Looking Backward and News from Nowhere are often read as oppositional, 
Darko Suvin, in his classic Metamorphoses of Science Fiction, makes an eloquent 
argument for the way in which these two texts might be the “perfect complement” to one 
another:  
Staying within the bourgeois—or indeed WASP—existentialist horizons, 
Bellamy had pursued the everyday need for security to its logical 
conclusion and ended up with a socialist dawn as an order of things, a 
societas rerum. Reneging on the bourgeois existential horizons but 
opposing them to unrealistically idealized—indeed bohemian—horizons, 
Morris pursued the arrested timeless moment, the visionary dream […] of 
Earthly Paradise to its logical conclusion and ended up with another aspect 
of that same dawn: creative and therefore beautiful human relations, a 
societas hominum. Between them, they covered the technical premises and 
the sensual horizons of that dawn: each lacks what the other has. (185, my 
emphasis) 
In Suvin’s conception, Bellamy provides the material structures and Morris the human 
conditions for a complete socialist vision that presents a holistic alternative to life in a 
capitalist society. My reading of the role of labor in these two texts fits, in significant 
ways, into this paradigm put forth by Suvin. While Morris transcends alienation in his 
understanding of labor as fundamental to the development of the individual as a creative 
being, his unwillingness to employ the collective power of centralized production leaves 




material foundations through the harnessing of a centralized system of production to the 
equal benefit of all his citizens, his understanding that true human development happens 
only outside the realm of material production limits his ability to move beyond alienation. 
In this way, each lacks what the other provides. Can we then, following Suvin’s pattern, 
graft Morris’s philosophy of labor onto the economic structures of Bellamy’s utopia? If 
so, what might it look like?  
While Suvin imagines Bellamy’s utopia as a “society of things,” the latter’s vision 
is not simply a materialistic one. His material conditions of production are structured by a 
humanist philosophy: like Morris, his end goal is a society in which every individual 
would be free to develop a full range of human capacities. Because, for Bellamy, material 
comfort is the precondition for this development, his focus on efficient production is 
intrinsically tied to this goal. The highly-regulated system of labor he imagines is 
designed to reduce the amount of time spent by each individual in the meeting of social 
needs to allow for her growth outside of this realm. While Morris holds the same 
humanistic goal, his belief that the individual can realize her human potential only 
through the active creation of her material world makes his means of achieving this end 
radically different. Therefore, any attempt to imagine a combination of the two socialist 
visions must contend with this fundamental philosophical difference. However, despite 
this rift, both thinkers open up possibilities in their respective utopias to allow for a 
merging of the two worlds.  
As I have argued, Bellamy’s utopia already significantly overcomes many aspects 
of the alienation created by capitalist labor relations. Bellamy’s creation of a society 




individual in the meeting of social needs radically breaks with the competitive 
individualism which underlies capitalist production. There is also much potential for the 
workers in Bellamy’s society to feel that they are expressing their humanity in the labor 
they perform: because they realize themselves as an intrinsic part of a unified social 
whole, acts of labor in the service of social needs become an expression of their 
essentially social being. Further, the matching of workers with employments for which 
they feel they are best suited, as well as the encouragement that each individual become 
skilled in his trade, act as additional means through which the worker can achieve self-
fulfillment in his labor time. However, because Bellamy still realizes necessary 
production as primarily a duty to be performed before life can begin, he is not concerned 
with integrating the full development of the individual with her acts of production. This is 
where Suvin’s conception of the complementary nature of the two utopias becomes 
problematic in application. Bellamy’s worker devotes his life to one trade; while the 
skilled nature of his labor makes him more than a “one-sided implement,” he is still 
limited in the scope of his productive activities. In Bellamy’s conception, one serves the 
nation either with “hands” or “brains” (42). While this distinction between physical and 
mental labor is certainly not as definitive in Bellamy’s utopia as his language suggests, a 
practical divide still exists between those who engage in primarily manual labor and 
those who engage in intellectual or artistic work. For Morris, the relegation of an 
individual to one type of labor would compromise the entire philosophical basis of his 
utopian vision. Because, in Morris’s conception, labor is life-activity, the development of 
the individual is intrinsically tied to the way in which she contributes to the needs of 




human capacities, she must be engaged in a variety of useful productive activities. The 
question then becomes: Can Bellamy’s highly regulated system of labor allow for the 
variance of productive activity that Morris imagines as essential? The answer, I believe, 
is yes. Morris’s system is predicated on individuals, without any structural guidance, 
determining social needs and meeting them through purely individual initiative. While 
this works in Morris’s small communities, this is not a feasible system on a large scale. 
Bellamy’s centralized organizational structure, which determines social demands and 
regulates production accordingly, does not disallow the engagement of the individual in 
multiple employments throughout his life. Bellamy’s extended, holistic educational 
period already provides the individual with an arsenal of skills and knowledge; instead of 
assuming that the individual will chose one employment for which they are best suited, 
and then employ the rest of that skill and knowledge in their “free” time, a system can be 
imagined that would allow the individual to integrate more of this holistic education into 
her work through the selection of three or four employments that span a range of labor 
types. The existence of Morris’s weaver/mathematician, for instance, could just as easily 
find a place in Bellamy’s socially-regulated labor force as in Morris’s wholly self-
directed one.  
Another problem that must be addressed in the merging of the two visions is the 
question of machinery: since Morris actively moves away from machine production in 
favor of handicraft, is this an intrinsic part of his labor philosophy that would clash with 
Bellamy’s reliance on industrial production? While Morris would likely not approve of 
the type of mass production that Bellamy imagines, it is not wholly incompatible with his 




mechanized production, Morris does not preclude this type of labor from contributing to 
the full development of the individual. While mechanical labor does not allow for the 
kind of creative variance that Morris undoubtedly favors, he argues that it can still 
become self-fulfilling both through the intrinsic pleasure of habitual activity as well as in 
the broader sense in which all useful labor is tied to self-fulfillment: through the sense of 
honor that arises in the individual who is contributing, as a social being intrinsically 
connected to her fellows, in a meaningful way to social existence. Thus, the efficiency of 
production in the meeting of social needs which industrial production allows need not be 
sacrificed in the service of eradicating alienated labor. As long as the individual can 
engage in a variety of productive activities, both within a particular trade and amongst 
various types of professions, mechanized labor can become one avenue for the 
individual’s full and free development.  
In The German Ideology, Marx argues that in a capitalist system, the existing 
socialized productive force of which the worker is an active part appears instead as 
something external to her; thus, she is alienated from her labor, which in reality unites her 
with these forces, because her own productive activity feels external to her: it loses “all 
semblance of life-activity” (96). The only way, then, in which the worker’s labor can 
become life-activity is through the unification of the worker with the means of 
production, and it is through this unification that she explores the full range of her human 
development: “The appropriation of these [productive] forces is itself nothing more than 
the development of the individual capacities corresponding to the material instruments of 
production. The appropriation of a totality of instruments of production is, for this very 




this text, Marx imagines that the appropriation by the workers of the vast and varied 
means of production which arise with industrial capitalism is equivalent to the full 
expression of their human capacities. In uniting her productive activity with a wide range 
of material instruments of production, her productive activity becomes just as varied. 
Because she is now expressing her full range of human capacities through her labor, her 
labor is no longer external to her self-fulfilling development; this results, for Marx, in 
“the transformation of labor into self-activity” (97, my emphasis). This, I believe, is the 
potential inherent in a merging of the utopian visions of Bellamy and Morris: the 
employment of all the material productive forces of capitalism by a collective labor force 
comprised of individuals who view their labor, not as a necessary burden to be overcome 
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